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Fact or Fiction: The Legal Construction of
Immigration Removal for Crimes
Maureen A. Sweeney †
Thousands of longterm legal permanent residents are removed from
the United States each year because they have been convicted of criminal
offenses, many quite minor. These removals occur without any of the
constitutional safeguards that generally protect criminal defendants.
Immigration authorities rely on cases asserting that such removals are not
punishment for crime, but rather remedial sanctions and merely collateral
consequences of conviction.
This Article challenges those conclusions. It argues that their factual
and doctrinal foundation has disintegrated over the last twenty years. Far
reaching changes in immigration law and enforcement have rendered
removal for many crimes a definite, immediate and largely automatic effect
on the range of the defendant’s punishment—that is, the direct consequence
of a conviction. As such, under the current framework, the state should
impose removal only subject to the same constitutional protections that
apply to criminal prosecutions. As a practical matter, this would mean that a
noncitizen defendant’s guilty plea (and waiver of the Sixth Amendment right
to trial) could only be considered knowing and voluntary if the defendant
understood the immigration consequences of the plea, and that effective
assistance of counsel would require advice about those consequences. In
addition, under the Eighth Amendment, removal could only be imposed when
it was not so disproportionate to the underlying crime as to be considered
cruel and unusual punishment. While removal has essentially become an
additional criminal sanction for noncitizens, this Article argues that it is not
particularly effective or appropriate. The Article thus advocates a deep
revision of immigration laws to restore removal as a sanction imposed in the
exercise of discretion on those whose criminal offenses outweigh their ties to
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the United States and the hardship they and their community would suffer if
they were deported.
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Introduction
The greatest joy and purpose of literary fiction is to tell us the truth.
Successful works of fiction use the techniques of invention to reveal deep
realities about our private and communal lives, the meaning of existence,
and the textures of human love, forgiveness, absurdity, humor, and hope. 1
1
Historical examples of fiction that helped tell important truths by portraying
fictionalized realities include HARPER LEE, TO KILL A MOCKINGBIRD (1960), which depicts racism in
the Jim Crow South; TONI MORRISON, BELOVED (1987), which puts a personal face on slavery; JOHN
STEINBECK, THE GRAPES OF WRATH (1939), which describes the trials of refugees from the Oklahoma
dust bowl of the 1930s; and HARRIET BEECHER STOWE, UNCLE TOM’S CABIN (Philip Van Doren Stern

48

6 SWEENEY.DOC

1/4/2010 12:44 PM

Fact or Fiction
There are instances where legal fictions serve the same important
purpose. Legal adoption of a child, for example, goes against our biological
understanding of parenthood and creates the legal construct of a parental
relationship between two biologically unrelated people. This is a “fiction”
in that it has no biological basis, but it speaks of and gives legal solidity to
the very real parental relationship that does exist between an adoptive
parent and her child. The legal “fiction” reflects the deeper reality.
Some legal fictions, though, serve more to obscure reality than to
reveal it. Such is the case with the theoretical construct of removal for
criminal activity. Under current immigration law, a noncitizen who is
convicted of any one of a large array of criminal offenses (some serious but
many others quite minor) is rendered removable and disqualified from
relief from removal solely because of that crime. Over the last decade,
immigration authorities deported tens of thousands of lawful permanent
residents as a result of such criminal conduct. Particularly for those with
spouses and children in this country, the consequences of removal were
far more severe than the terms of their criminal sentences. However,
courts have consistently held that removal is not punishment for crime but
is instead a remedial civil sanction and a collateral, rather than direct,
consequence of a conviction. This theoretical characterization of removal
developed many decades ago in the context of the very different
immigration law that existed then. It no longer corresponds in any
meaningful way to the realities of immigration law and enforcement,
which have changed radically in the last two decades. It has become a
fiction that obscures rather than reflects any level of reality.
As a result of this legal construct, however, the sanction of removal,
severe and automatic as it has become, has been allowed to attach to
criminal convictions outside the protections of the Constitution that
generally apply to punishment for criminal activity. 2 Removal for crimes is
now imposed with fewer procedural protections than ever and with no
concern for its proportionality to the underlying criminal activity. The
United States Supreme Court recently acknowledged the constitutional
ed., Paul S. Eriksson Inc. 1964) (1852), which portrays the evils of slavery. Marilynne Robinson’s
recent diptych of novels is a beautiful example of fiction eloquently telling truths of family,
forgiveness, hope, and the beauty of seemingly insignificant and forgotten people and places. See
MARILYNNE ROBINSON, GILEAD (2004); MARILYNNE ROBINSON, HOME (2008).
2
The Sixth Amendment, for example, requires that any waiver of the constitutional right
to trial be voluntary and “knowing,” which requires, in turn, that the defendant understand the
charges against him or her and the potential consequences of the conviction. Brady v. United
States, 397 U.S. 742, 755 (1970); Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969). However, this
requirement applies only to the “direct,” punishment‐related consequences of a conviction and not
to “collateral” consequences. See, e.g., United States v. Crowley, 529 F.2d 1066, 1072 (3d Cir.
1976); Cuthrell v. Director, 475 F.2d 1364, 1366 (4th Cir. 1973). Deportation has consistently been
held to be a collateral civil sanction, and defendants need not be advised of the possibility that
they may be deported in order for their waiver of constitutional rights to be knowing and
voluntary. See, e.g., Santos‐Sanchez v. United States, 548 F.3d 327, 336 (5th Cir. 2008).
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import of these issues when it granted certiorari in a case involving the
question of whether the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of
counsel requires criminal defense attorneys to provide accurate advice
about the fact that a proposed plea agreement may or will lead to the
defendant’s removal. 3 Even if the Court answers in the affirmative,
however, a whole host of other vital procedural rights will continue to be
denied legal immigrants accused of crimes as a result of this legal
construct.
An understanding of removal as punishment is certainly the reality
lived by many criminal defendants who deal with immigration
consequences in the context of plea negotiations. These lawful permanent
residents (and other legally authorized individuals such as asylees and
refugees) often accept longer terms of actual incarceration, extensions of
parole or supervised release, and other negative terms in plea agreements
in exchange for avoiding conditions that could prejudice their immigration
status. 4 They are willing to accept additional incarceration and probation,
which are universally acknowledged to be punishment, for protection from
removal, the sanction they consider more serious. 5
Yet courts at all levels have nearly universally rejected attempts by
noncitizens facing deportation to claim the constitutional protections
accorded to those facing punishment for crimes. 6 The courts have done so
by relying on longstanding precedent which holds that removal is not
punitive but is rather a remedial sanction designed to end an ongoing
violation of civil immigration law, and that it is the indirect or collateral
consequence of a conviction rather than direct punishment for the
underlying crime.
For moral and doctrinal reasons, this legal construction of removal
has become untenable, and the time has come to reexamine it. The human
cost of our current legal construction of removal is extremely high. Tens of
thousands of individuals are removed for crimes each year, many after
entering guilty pleas without any knowledge that their plea would lead
directly to their removal and permanent banishment from the United
3
Commonwealth v. Padilla, 253 S.W.3d 482 (Ky. 2008) (posing the questions whether
criminal defense counsel is required to advise a defendant of the automatic sanction of
deportation for an aggravated felony conviction and whether affirmative misadvice from criminal
defense counsel about deportation consequences constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel
under the Sixth Amendment), cert. granted, 129 S. Ct. 1317 (2009).
4
Telephone Interviews and E‐mail Correspondence with Joanna Silver, Fed. Pub.
Defender, Dist. of Md. (Jan. 9, 2009); Laura Harper, Fed. Pub. Defender, N. Dist. of Tex., Dallas Div.
(Jan. 7, 2009); Frank Mangan, Fed. Pub. Defender, S. Dist. of Cal., San Diego Div. (Jan. 7, 2009) (on
file with The Yale Journal on Regulation).
5
Id.
6
See, e.g., Nikolaev v. Weber, 705 N.W.2d 72, 76 (S.D. 2005) (“‘[T]he overwhelming
majority of courts to have addressed the question . . . have held that deportation is a collateral
consequence . . . .’” (quoting State v. Zarate, 651 N.W.2d 215, 222 (Neb. 2002))); see also United
States v. Nagaro‐Garbin, 653 F. Supp. 586, 589 (E.D. Mich. 1987).
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States, with no possibility for deviation, equity, or mercy. Many of those
removed are lawful permanent residents of the United States who have
parents, children, spouses, and other immediate family members who are
themselves United States citizens or lawful permanent residents. The
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) recently reported that it had
deported more than 100,000 parents of children who are U.S. citizens in
the ten years prior to 2007. 7 These families are faced with a life‐shattering
decision: should they acquiesce to the permanent break‐up of their family
through the removal of one of their members, or should they uproot the
entire family and move permanently to a country that may have never
been home to any of them except the one being deported, where none of
them may speak the language, where medical care may be lacking, and
where they may have no support network and few educational, social, or
job prospects? Even those permanent residents without immediate family
in the United States often have long residence here and face the loss of
deeply rooted lives amid communities, workplaces, businesses, churches,
and friends. The impact of removal is profound; as the United States
Supreme Court wrote in Ng Fung Ho v. White, removal may result in “loss
of both property and life; or of all that makes life worth living.” 8
This Article will argue that the current legal construction of removal
for crimes was built many years ago on statutory and factual
underpinnings that have since disintegrated. The legal and enforcement
framework that gave rise to the construction of deportation as “remedial”
and “collateral” simply no longer exists, and current realities of
immigration law and enforcement neither support nor justify the
prevailing legal construction. Part I reviews the state of the law and the
literature with regard to collateral consequences generally and
deportation specifically. Part II lays out the historical legal context in
which the jurisprudence developed and the changes to the legal and
enforcement framework of immigration over the last two decades. Part III
analyzes the current legal and factual framework to find that removal for
such criminal convictions is punitive rather than remedial in nature and is
the direct functional consequence of a conviction. Part IV looks at the
practical and constitutional implications of concluding that removal is the
direct and punitive consequence of an aggravated felony conviction and
poses the question whether automatic removal is an effective and
appropriate sanction for crime. The Conclusion proposes some possible
resolutions to the constitutional dilemma raised by the current system.

7
Michael Falcone, 100,000 Parents of Citizens Were Deported over 10 Years, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 14, 2009, at A16.
8
259 U.S. 276, 284 (1922).
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The Immigration Consequences of Convictions

A.

The Courts
1.

Vol. 27:1, 2010

Remedial and Collateral Consequences of Convictions Generally

Throughout the twentieth century, the courts developed a wide‐
ranging jurisprudence regarding the relationship between criminal
proceedings and various consequences that result from criminal
convictions. This jurisprudence has often focused on whether criminal
defendants have the right to be advised of, and represented in proceedings
regarding, the imposition of these consequences. The relevant line of cases
arose in the context of a variety of consequences, including discretionary
loss of “good time” credit, 9 parole eligibility, 10 civil commitment to a
mental health facility, 11 concurrent sentencing, 12 loss of voting rights, 13
and maximum possible incarceration. 14 Courts have varied in their
analysis of which consequences warrant constitutional protections and
which do not, generally finding defendants to be entitled to the
constitutional protections of criminal proceedings only when they have
found a consequence of conviction to be punitive (rather than remedial) in
nature and the direct (rather than collateral) consequence of the
conviction. 15 These principles have come to be known as the collateral
consequences doctrine.
In applying the doctrine, courts have looked first to the stated and
effective purpose of a sanction to determine whether it is punitive or
remedial in nature. 16 While the stated purpose is not necessarily
dispositive and courts can consider a strongly punitive effect, 17 the
Supreme Court has held that courts should reject the stated legislative
intent “only where a party challenging the statute provides ‘the clearest
proof’ that ‘the statutory scheme [is] so punitive either in purpose or effect

9
Hutchison v. United States, 450 F.2d 930, 931 (10th Cir. 1971).
10
Paige v. United States, 443 F.2d 781 (4th Cir. 1971); Yoswick v. State, 700 A.2d 251
(Md. 1997).
11
Cuthrell v. Director, 475 F.2d 1364 (4th Cir. 1973).
12
Tindall v. United States, 469 F.2d 92 (5th Cir. 1972).
13
Meaton v. United States, 328 F.2d 379 (5th Cir. 1964).
14
Combs v. United States, 391 F.2d 1017 (9th Cir. 1968); Pilkington v. United States, 315
F.2d 204, 210 (4th Cir. 1963).
15
See, e.g., Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 369 (1997) (“Our conclusion that the Act
is nonpunitive thus removes an essential prerequisite for both Hendricks’ double jeopardy and ex
post facto claims.”).
16
Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 96 (1958).
17
Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 361.
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as to negate [the State’s] intention’ to deem it ‘civil.’” 18 As a practical
matter, courts have been very willing to accept legislative statements of
remedial effect. 19
With regard to the direct versus collateral determination, courts have
generally applied a practical standard. Some courts simply state in
conclusory fashion that a consequence is direct or collateral. 20 Other
courts acknowledge the difficulty of making the distinction, but then rely
on the determination made in prior cases rather than engaging in any
independent analysis. 21 A relatively small number of courts apply a more
substantive analysis. These courts have generally based their
consideration on whether the consequence is punitive in nature and the
practical realities of the procedural relationship between entry of the
conviction and imposition of the consequence.
Courts have applied different standards, but the most robust and
widely applied standard is that put forth by the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit in 1973, in Cuthrell v. Director, 22 and adopted by six
other federal circuit courts of appeals. 23 The court in Cuthrell stated that
the directness of a consequence turned on whether it “represent[ed] a
definite, immediate and largely automatic effect on the range of the
defendant’s punishment.” 24 That case involved the involuntary
commitment of a defendant for treatment in a state hospital as a “defective
delinquent.” The court found that such commitment was not a direct
consequence of conviction, noting that the commitment proceeding that
followed the defendant’s conviction was a separate civil proceeding in
which the defendant “would be afforded counsel and all due process
rights,” and that the outcome was far from certain, depending on the
testimony and conclusions of trained experts and the independent
judgment of a judge or jury. 25 In short, “[c]ommitment thus depended not
directly on the defendant’s plea but on a subsequent, independent civil
18
Id. (quoting United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248‐49 (1980)).
19
See, e.g., Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 105 (2003); Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 368‐69; Turner
v. Glickman, 207 F.3d 419, 428‐30 (7th Cir. 2000).
20
See, e.g., Meaton v. United States, 328 F.2d 379, 381 (5th Cir. 1964) (“There was no
abuse of discretion in the refusal of the court to grant leave to withdraw the plea of guilty because
the appellant failed to understand the collateral effects such as the loss of civic rights.”).
21
See, e.g., United States v. Russell, 686 F.2d 35, 38‐39 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (“The distinction
between a collateral and a direct consequence of a criminal conviction, like many of the lines
drawn in legal analysis, is obvious at the extremes and often subtle at the margin.”).
22
475 F.2d 1364 (4th Cir. 1973).
23
See Steele v. Murphy, 365 F.3d 14, 17 (1st Cir. 2004); United States v. Littlejohn, 224
F.3d 960, 965 (9th Cir. 2000); United States v. Kikuyama, 109 F.3d 536, 537 (9th Cir. 1997); Parry
v. Rosemeyer, 64 F.3d 110, 114 (3d Cir. 1995); King v. Dutton, 17 F.3d 151, 155 (6th Cir. 1994);
United States v. U.S. Currency in Amount of $228,536.00, 895 F.2d 908, 916 (2d Cir. 1990); George
v. Black, 732 F.2d 108, 110 (8th Cir. 1984); see also United States v. Lott, 630 F. Supp. 611, 612
(E.D. Va. 1986).
24
Cuthrell, 475 F.2d at 1366.
25
Id.
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trial” 26 of substance. The court emphasized the lack of certainty in the
outcome of the post‐conviction commitment process, pointing out that (1)
not all those convicted were ordered evaluated for delinquency; (2) of
those evaluated, one‐third were not recommended for commitment; and
(3) of those recommended, one‐fifth prevailed at jury trial. 27 In addition,
the court observed that the purpose of the commitment was not
punishment but treatment and rehabilitation of an individual with a
mental disorder. 28
2.

The Nature of Immigration Consequences

Over the years, many courts have addressed the specific question of
the implications in the criminal procedural context of a deportation that is
triggered solely by the outcome of that criminal proceeding. These courts
have generally relied on the characterization of deportation as a remedial
sanction and have also virtually universally held that deportation is a
collateral consequence of a conviction; for these reasons, a criminal
defendant’s constitutional protections do not attach to proceedings
relating to the immigration consequences of a conviction. 29
The Supreme Court first held that deportation proceedings were civil
and remedial in nature, rather than punitive, in the 1893 case of Fong Yue
Ting v. United States. 30 At that time, immigration law was in its infancy,
and the only provisions allowing for deportation related to the failure of
individuals to comply with the terms of their admission to the country.
There were no deportation provisions triggered by post‐entry conduct
such as the commission of a crime. 31 It was in this context that the
Supreme Court held deportation to be a civil, regulatory sanction whose
purpose was not to punish but to remedy an ongoing violation of the
conditions under which a person had been admitted to the United States. 32
26
Id.
27
Id. at 1367.
28
Id.
29
See, e.g., United States v. Amador‐Leal, 276 F.3d 511, 516‐17 (9th Cir. 2002), cert.
denied, 535 U.S. 1070 (2002); United States v. Romero‐Vilca, 850 F.2d 177, 179 (3d Cir. 1988)
(“[W]e hold that potential removal is a collateral consequence of a guilty plea.”); State v. Muriithi,
46 P.3d 1145, 1155 (Kan. 2002); People v. DeJesus, 819 N.Y.S.2d 442, 445 (Crim. Ct. 2006);
Nikolaev v. Weber, 705 N.W.2d 72, 76 (S.D. 2005); Valle v. State, 132 P.3d 181, 184 (Wyo. 2006).
30
149 U.S. 698, 730 (1893).
31
Daniel Kanstroom, Deportation, Social Control, and Punishment: Some Thoughts About
Why Hard Laws Make Bad Cases, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1889, 1908‐09 (2000).
32
Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 730 (“The order of deportation is not a punishment for
crime. It is not a banishment, in the sense in which that word is often applied to the expulsion of a
citizen from his country by way of punishment. It is but a method of enforcing the return to his
own country of an alien who has not complied with the conditions upon the performance of which
the government of the nation, acting within its constitutional authority and through the proper
departments, has determined that his continuing to reside here shall depend. He has not,
therefore, been deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law; and the provisions
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As such, deportation could be imposed in proceedings that did not
comport with the protections that the Fourth, Sixth, and Eighth
Amendments provide to criminal defendants. 33
This doctrine has remained the cornerstone of this jurisprudence
since the nineteenth century, despite many changes to the law and
procedures regarding deportation during the twentieth century. In 1999,
the Supreme Court reiterated this holding in the case of Reno v. American
Arab AntiDiscrimination Committee, 34 in which Justice Scalia’s majority
opinion states without further elaboration:
Even when deportation is sought because of some act the alien has
committed, in principle the alien is not being punished for that act (criminal
charges may be available for that separate purpose) but is merely being
held to the terms under which he was admitted. And in all cases,
deportation is necessary in order to bring to an end an ongoing violation of
the United States law. 35

B.

The Literature on Collateral Consequences in Immigration

Commentators have challenged both the use of the direct versus
collateral distinction as the deciding factor in determining constitutional
protections as a general matter and the characterization of deportation as
a collateral remedial sanction.
1.

The Literature on Collateral Consequences Generally

A chorus of commentators has analyzed the appropriateness,
constitutionality, and wisdom of the growing body of collateral
consequences of criminal convictions, including loss of civil rights,
ineligibility for public benefits, employment‐related restrictions, and
ineligibility for jury service. 36 These commentators have analyzed
collateral consequences in light of the traditional purposes and

of the Constitution, securing the right of trial by jury, and prohibiting unreasonable searches and
seizures, and cruel and unusual punishments, have no application.”).
33
Id.
34
525 U.S. 471 (1999).
35
Id. at 491.
36
For a good summary of the legal issues regarding collateral consequences, see
generally Michael Pinard, An Integrated Perspective on the Collateral Consequences of Criminal
Convictions and Reentry Issues Faced by Formerly Incarcerated Individuals, 86 B.U. L. R EV. 623,
634‐47 (2006) [hereinafter Pinard, Integrated Perspective]. For a summary of the various
analyses and commentaries, see id. at 658‐66; and Michael Pinard, The Logistical and Ethical
Difficulties of Informing Juveniles About the Collateral Consequences of Adjudications, 6 N EV . L.J.
1111, 1112 (2006).
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justifications of punishment, 37 challenged the legal distinction between
criminal and civil penalties, and contested the use of the distinction to
justify the absence of substantive procedural protections relating to these
rights in criminal proceedings. 38 A survey of state court judges found that,
with regard to collateral consequences generally, nearly four out of five
judges believed that it was unclear whether their states’ collateral
consequences were punitive or remedial in purpose, 39 although they
recognized the collateral consequences’ substantial punitive effects. 40
The American Bar Association (ABA) has also studied the issue of
collateral consequences extensively and has issued a set of Standards on
Collateral Sanctions and Discretionary Disqualification of Convicted
Persons (“Standards”). 41 The Standards proceed from the premise that “it
is neither fair nor efficient for the criminal justice system to label
significant legal disabilities and penalties as ‘collateral’ and thereby give
permission to ignore them in the process of criminal sentencing.” 42 Thus,
rather than arguing the specifics of classification of consequences as direct
or collateral, the Standards start from the premise that the distinction
should not necessarily dictate the treatment of those consequences in
criminal proceedings. The Standards are aimed at the integration of all
legal consequences of convictions (regardless of their traditional
characterization) into the criminal sentencing system. The Standards thus
seek to ensure that any sanction is appropriate to the conduct underlying
the conviction, that all actors are aware of all sanctions, and that a court or
administrative body is empowered to waive or modify any sanction where
appropriate. 43 In a case that is currently pending before the Supreme
Court, 44 the ABA has used the Standards to argue specifically in the
removal context that criminal defense counsel has a duty to advise any
noncitizen defendant of the immigration consequences of conviction when
that defendant is considering whether to plead guilty. 45

37
Nora V. Demleitner, Preventing Internal Exile: The Need for Restrictions on Collateral
Sentencing Consequences, 11 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 153, 160‐61 (1999), cited in Pinard, Integrated
Perspective, supra note 36, at 659.
38
See Pinard, Integrated Perspective, supra note 36, at 659‐60 (citing various scholarly
works).
Alec C. Ewald & Marnie Smith, Collateral Consequences of Criminal Convictions in
39
American Courts: The View from the State Bench, 29 J U ST. S YS . J. 145, 155 (2008).
40
Id. at 161.
41
AM. BAR ASS’N, ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: COLLATERAL SANCTIONS AND
DISCRETIONARY DISQUALIFICATION OF CONVICTED PERSONS (3d ed. 2004) [hereinafter ABA STANDARDS
ON COLLATERAL SANCTIONS].
42
Id. at 11.
43
Id. at 12‐13.
44
Padilla v. Kentucky, 129 S. Ct. 1317 (2009).
45
Brief of the American Bar Ass’n as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner, Padilla v.
Kentucky, 129 S. Ct. 1317 (2009) (No. 08‐651), 2009 WL 1567355.
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2.

The Literature on Removal as a Consequence of Conviction

Though the conventional wisdom of case law is unwavering in stating
that deportation is not punishment for wrongdoing, 46 a number of
commentators and scholars have recently reexamined the history and
contemporary legal framework of removal for crimes and have argued that
removability based on criminal convictions constitutes punishment for
wrongdoing. 47
Daniel Kanstroom has pointed out the significance of the distinction
between two types of removal provisions in our law: those “border
control” provisions related to regulation of entry and exit at borders, and
those provisions related to “social control”—that is, provisions that relate
to individuals’ post‐entry behavior. 48 Border control provisions relate to
requirements for and conditions on admissions and authorized stays in the
country, including such requirements as a valid visa for entry and
adherence with visa conditions (such as enrollment in school or refraining
from employment). Kanstroom points out that constitutional questions
about the nature of the sanction of deportation first arose in the context of
the enforcement of border control provisions regulating conditions for
entry, and the courts reasonably held that such deportations were
regulatory in nature and not intended to punish the individual for any
wrongful conduct. 49 In this context, the Supreme Court developed a
doctrinal structure basing the government’s power to deport on its plenary
power to regulate immigration, limited only by basic principles of
procedural due process. 50 A key principle of this structure is that
deportation is a remedial action designed to correct the ongoing violation
of a regulatory requirement, such as the requirement of a valid visa to
authorize entry and presence in the United States, or the requirement that
the holder of a student visa be enrolled full‐time in an American school.
This doctrinal structure has stood from those early days and has been
used to justify a broad deportation power, despite the development of a
significant body of “social control” deportation provisions used to deport
lawful permanent residents and others based solely on post‐entry conduct

46
See Stephen H. Legomsky, The New Path of Immigration Law: Asymmetric
Incorporation of Criminal Justice Norms, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 469, 512 (2007) (arguing that
decisions relying on formalistic characterization of deportation as a “civil” proceeding rather than
punitive are “long on citation of precedent and short on independent reasoning”).
47
See Kanstroom, supra note 31; Legomsky, supra note 46, at 512; Robert Pauw, A New
Look at Deportation as Punishment: Why at Least Some of the Constitution’s Criminal Procedure
Protections Must Apply, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 305 (2000); Juliet P. Stumpf, Penalizing Immigrants, 18
FED. SENT’G REP. 264 (2006).
48
Kanstroom, supra note 31, at 1906.
49
Id. at 1901, 1908; see Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 693 (1893).
50
Kanstroom, supra note 31, at 1910.
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in no way related to the conditions of their admission or authorized stay. 51
Kanstroom argues that these social control provisions are conceptually
distinct from border control provisions and are not regulatory in the same
way that justified earlier analysis of deportation. Rather, social control
deportation provisions do, in fact, constitute punishment for the post‐
entry conduct being sanctioned. As such, they should be subject to
constitutional protections relating to punishment. 52
Stephen Legomsky argues that the stated “remedial” purpose of
deportation—removing the offender from the community—is not, by its
nature, remedial at all, but rather one of the classic purposes of
punishment, the incapacitation of the offender. 53 Legomsky and other
commentators also argue that removal as applied to otherwise lawful
residents who are convicted of criminal wrongdoing serves the classic
penal purposes of retribution and deterrence of others. 54
Other commentators, including Robert Pauw, have also observed the
move of modern courts away from an “all‐or‐nothing” distinction between
civil proceedings (which result in purely remedial sanctions) and criminal
proceedings (which result in punishment), and the courts’ resulting
willingness to acknowledge punishment imposed in some circumstances in
civil proceedings, and to accord some constitutional protections to such
proceedings. 55 The Supreme Court has in recent decades held that
sanctions imposed in civil proceedings must be justified by a legitimate
remedial government interest and must be proportionate to that
purpose. 56 If they cannot be justified as proportionately serving a remedial
purpose, they will be seen as punitive and subject to the Constitution’s
limitations on the imposition of punishment. 57 While the Court has been
less than entirely consistent or clear over the years on how to analyze
punitive intent, 58 it has recognized a principle of analysis that is
51
See, e.g., Reno v. Am.‐Arab Anti‐Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 491 (1999).
52
Kanstroom, supra note 31, at 1935.
53
Legomsky, supra note 46, at 514.
54
Id.; see also Pauw, supra note 47, at 328; Stumpf, supra note 47, at 265.
55
Pauw, supra note 47, at 316; see Kanstroom, supra note 31, at 1920.
56
United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267 (1996) (holding that a civil in rem forfeiture
action does not impose punishment and thus does not implicate the Double Jeopardy Clause);
Dep’t of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. 767 (1994) (finding that a tax on possession of illegal
drugs, assessed after criminal penalty, could be considered punishment implicating the Double
Jeopardy Clause); Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 621 (1993) (holding that a civil drug
forfeiture action had the purpose of imposing punishment and was subject to Eighth Amendment
limits).
57
Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 96 (1958) (“[I]f the statute imposes a disability for the
purposes of punishment—that is, to reprimand the wrongdoer, to deter others, etc.—it has been
considered penal. But a statute has been considered nonpenal if it imposes a disability, not to
punish, but to accomplish some other legitimate governmental purpose.”). For a discussion of the
constitutional limitations that may apply if deportation is recognized as punishment, see Pauw,
supra note 47, at 337‐44.
58
Kanstroom, supra note 31, at 1925‐26.
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essentially functional and considers the actual impact of a sanction rather
than simply its legislative label. 59 The Court has recognized as punitive
civil sanctions in cases involving civil drug forfeiture, 60 civil fines for false
medical expense claims, 61 taxes on illegal drug possession, 62 and in rem
forfeiture. 63
Pointing to the Court’s willingness to look beyond the formalistic
criminal versus civil label and to assess the actual effect of a sanction,
Pauw and others have made the case for a functional analysis of the effect
of removal on lawful permanent residents who are otherwise authorized
to remain indefinitely in the United States. 64 Recognizing the punitive
effect of the sanction would allow for constitutionally based procedural
protections for noncitizens in criminal proceedings. Lea McDermid has
argued that the unique severity of the removal sanction and the increased
likelihood of its imposition following recent statutory changes justify the
abandonment of the collateral consequences doctrine as the linchpin for
determining the appropriateness of constitutional protections. 65 John J.
Francis has also argued that the principles behind Rule 11(b) of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 66 which seeks to ensure that any
guilty plea is entered voluntarily and with knowledge of its consequences,
and the constitutional case law require that defendants be aware of the
possibility of removal, given its unique severity. 67
The remainder of this Article will analyze the historical legal context
in which courts first found deportation to be a remedial and collateral
consequence of conviction, the current realities of immigration law and
enforcement relating to convictions, and the implications of those realities
for the analytical framework underpinning the jurisprudence.

59
Id.; Pauw, supra note 47, at 328.
60
Austin, 509 U.S. at 621.
61
United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435 (1989). In Hudson v. United States, the Court
rejected the Double Jeopardy Clause analysis of Halper, but it did not overrule its finding that civil
sanctions in civil proceedings may constitute punishment. Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 96
(1997).
62
Dep’t of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. 767, 779 (1994).
63
See United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267 (1996).
64
Kanstroom, supra note 31, at 1928; Pauw, supra note 47, at 332.
65
Lea McDermid, Deportation Is Different: Noncitizens and Ineffective Assistance of
Counsel, 89 C AL . L. R EV . 741 (2001) (discussing whether courts should raise the standard on what
qualifies as effective assistance of counsel in the immigration context).
66
FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b).
67
John J. Francis, Failure to Advise NonCitizens of Immigration Consequences of Criminal
Convictions: Should This Be Grounds to Withdraw a Guilty Plea?, 36 U. MICH. J.L. R EFORM 691, 719‐
20 (2003).
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The Historical Legal Context for the Development of the
Jurisprudence of Immigration Consequences

Many of the early decisions addressing the direct versus collateral
distinction in immigration consequences took the standards of analysis
developed for other consequences and applied them to the laws,
procedure, and practical realities of immigration enforcement that existed
at that time. 68 Based on this analysis of the legal landscape of immigration,
they concluded that deportation was not a direct consequence of a
criminal conviction. In order to correctly understand the decisions from
this period, it is important to have a good understanding of the legal and
enforcement context of immigration law on which the courts based their
analysis.
A.

The Early Immigration Landscape

U.S. immigration law has long imposed significant consequences on
certain criminal convictions. However, for many decades, through equally
longstanding law, procedure, and practice, these consequences were also
subject to uncertainties and vagaries of enforcement and open to
amelioration through widely available discretionary waivers of
deportability for those convicted of crimes. Since 1917, noncitizens who
have committed crimes “involving moral turpitude” have been excludable
from the United States. 69 At the same time, however, immigration law has
also provided a broad discretionary exception to such exclusion for long‐
term residents who could show that they deserved a second chance. 70
Like the Immigration Act of 1917, the 1952 Immigration and
Nationality Act (INA) mandated exclusion for immigrants convicted of
crimes involving moral turpitude or drug trafficking. 71 Also like the prior
law, the INA in 1952 gave the Attorney General broad discretion to grant
legal status to individuals notwithstanding their convictions, provided they
had resided in the United States for seven years. 72 This section 212(c)

68
See, e.g., Daley v. State, 487 A.2d 320 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1985). In contrast, some
courts considering the directness of deportation simply stated in conclusory fashion that
deportation was a collateral consequence. See, e.g., United States v. Parrino, 212 F.2d 919, 921 (2d.
Cir. 1954) (“[Deportability] is a liability which may, and in this case does, depend on a conviction
of crime. But it is nonetheless a collateral consequence of conviction.”).
69
Immigration Act of 1917, ch. 29, 39 Stat. 874, 875, cited in Immigration &
Naturalization Serv. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 294 (2001).
70
39 Stat. at 878. For a brief summary of the applicable provisions, see St. Cyr, 533 U.S.
at 294.
71
See Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 82‐414, 66 Stat. 163 (1952)
[hereinafter INA].
72
66 Stat. at 187; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) (repealed 1996).
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waiver, named for its location in the INA, was also regularly used to waive
deportation for lawful permanent residents of at least seven years. 73
The accepted standard for granting section 212(c) relief was a
weighing of the equities of the case. 74 A court applying section 212(c) had
to weigh the negative factors (including the nature and underlying
circumstances of any immigration violation or ground for exclusion; the
nature, seriousness, and recency of any criminal convictions; and other
evidence of an applicant’s bad character) against the positive factors
(including family ties in the United States; residence of long duration; age
at entry; hardship to the family or the applicant if deported; employment
history; property; military service; service to the community; evidence of
rehabilitation; and other evidence of good character). The immigration
judge was to balance the positive and adverse factors and decide on the
record as a whole whether the applicant was deserving of a positive
exercise of discretion. 75
Relief under section 212(c) was granted in a wide range of cases
involving a wide range of convictions, even quite serious ones. In the
period between 1989 and 1995, over ten thousand individuals were
granted section 212(c) relief. 76 More than half of all section 212(c)
applications filed during that time period were granted. 77 As a result, a
broad expectation developed in the immigrant community that, even with
a criminal conviction, an individual would have a chance to fight
deportation by appealing to the discretion of an immigration judge. 78 In
addition, at the time of many of the early decisions about the directness of
immigration consequences, immigration law provided for judicial
recommendations against deportation (JRADs), which, if granted by a
judge in a criminal proceeding, prohibited the federal government from
using a conviction as the basis for deportation or exclusion. 79
Finally, at the time of these decisions, there was little coordination
between the criminal and the immigration bureaucracies, and the
enforcement of deportation or exclusion provisions against individuals
with convictions was uneven at best. Many deportable individuals were

73
Matter of Silva, 16 I. & N. Dec. 26, 30 (B.I.A. 1976) (adopting the position of Francis v.
Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 532 F.2d 268 (2d Cir. 1976)).
74
See In re Marin, 16 I. & N. Dec. 581, 584‐85 (B.I.A. 1978).
75
Id.
76
See Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 296 (2001) (citing Julie
K. Rannik, The AntiTerrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996: A Death Sentence for the
212(c) Waiver, 28 U. MIAMI INTER‐AM. L. REV. 123, 150 n.80 (1996)).
77
Id.
78
This is the argument in Immigration & Naturalization Service v. St. Cyr, in which the
Supreme Court upheld retroactive eligibility for section 212(c) relief based on criminal defendants
having pled guilty with the expectation of section 212(c) eligibility in immigration proceedings.
533 U.S. at 325.
79
INA § 241(b), 66 Stat. at 208 (repealed 1990); 8 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (repealed 1990).
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able to remain in the United States for many years without threat of
removal, as long as they did not bring themselves to the attention of the
government by leaving and seeking to reenter the country or by applying
for some immigration or naturalization benefit. 80
B.

The FactBased Analysis of the Early Courts

Daley v. State, 81 a 1985 decision of the Maryland Court of Special
Appeals, illustrates how many early courts applied the existing standards
in the immigration context. The Daley court applied the Fourth Circuit’s
criteria from Cuthrell v. Director 82 to determine whether immigration
consequences were direct or collateral consequences of criminal
convictions. The court’s analysis in Daley is typical of the reasoning of
other courts from the era, and it reveals the extent to which such courts
grounded their decisions in the factual context of the landscape of
immigration law that existed at the time of the decision.
The Daley court looked to the standard articulated in Cuthrell, which
asked whether the consequence of a conviction “represents a definite,
immediate and largely automatic effect on the range of the defendant’s
punishment.” 83 The Daley court first observed that deportation arises in
the context of a civil proceeding separate from the criminal proceeding. 84
The court next observed that deportation was “neither ‘definite’ nor
‘largely automatic,’” referring specifically to the availability of
discretionary relief including the section 212(c) waiver which was then
widely available to individuals with convictions. 85 Finally, the court found
that the deportation proceedings in the case before it were not necessarily
“immediate,” as the defendant only came to the attention of the
immigration authorities when he attempted to reenter the country nearly
two years after his guilty plea. 86 The court rightly observed that, in the
enforcement landscape of 1985, proceedings “might never have been
instituted” against Mr. Daley had he not left the country, and held that
deportation was a collateral consequence. 87

80
For a detailed discussion of the profound problems in the enforcement of deportation
against individuals with criminal convictions through the late 1990s, see Peter H. Schuck & John
Williams, Removing Criminal Aliens: The Pitfalls and Promises of Federalism, 22 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 367 (1999).
81
487 A.2d 320 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1985).
82
475 F.2d 1364 (4th Cir. 1973).
83
Id. at 1366.
84
Daley, 487 A.2d at 322.
85
Id. This form of relief was repealed in the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) in 1996. See discussion infra Section II.C.
86
Daley, 487 A.2d at 322.
87
Id.
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C.

Changes to the Immigration Landscape

In the late 1980s, Congress began to revise the INA as it related to
individuals with convictions. The resulting revisions have been profound
and have undermined the factual basis for the courts’ early decisions on
the nature of the immigration consequences of convictions. The revisions
began slowly and gathered steam until they culminated in 1996 with the
revolution in the law of immigration and convictions that was embodied in
the passage of two laws: the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
of 1996 (AEDPA), 88 and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA). 89 These changes vastly expanded the
universe of crimes for which an individual could be excluded or deported,
eliminated the Attorney General’s discretion to waive removal for those
convicted of many offenses, allowed criminal sentencing judges to impose
deportation or removal directly for any removable individual, and made a
number of other significant changes related to the imposition of
deportation following the entry of a conviction.
Congress started down this road with the Anti‐Drug Abuse Act of
1988 90 when it invented the category of offense called the “aggravated
felony,” which at that time was defined as murder or trafficking in drugs or
weapons. 91 Those convicted of aggravated felonies were made deportable,
were subject to mandatory detention during deportation proceedings, and
were disqualified from a form of relief from deportation called “voluntary
departure.” 92 At that time, Congress also expanded the range of firearms
offenses that rendered one deportable. 93 It did not, however, make any
changes to the section 212(c) discretionary relief from deportation, which
still provided relief to thousands of noncitizens convicted of crimes.
In 1990, Congress again acted to expand deportability and restrict
discretionary relief for those convicted of crimes. It expanded the
definition of an “aggravated felony” to include drug trafficking, money
laundering, and any crime of violence for which a term of imprisonment of
five years or more was imposed; it also barred section 212(c)
discretionary relief for anyone convicted of an aggravated felony who was

88
Pub. L. No. 104‐132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996) [hereinafter AEDPA].
89
Pub. L. No. 104‐208, 110 Stat. 3009‐546 (1996) [hereinafter IIRIRA].
90
Pub. L. No. 100‐690, 102 Stat. 4181 (1988) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 19‐22 U.S.C., 25 U.S.C., 28‐29 U.S.C., 31 U.S.C., 42 U.S.C., and 50 U.S.C.) [hereinafter Anti‐Drug
Abuse Act].
91
Id. § 7342, 102 Stat. at 4469‐70.
92
Id. §§ 7344(a), 7343(a), 7343(b), 102 Stat. at 4470‐71. Voluntary departure is
discretionary relief which allows certain individuals who are out of lawful status to depart the
United States by a certain deadline and without a formal order of deportation or removal, thus
avoiding the negative consequences of such an order. INA § 240B, 8 U.S.C. § 1229c (2006).
93
Anti‐Drug Abuse Act § 7342, 102 Stat. at 4469‐70.
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sentenced to at least five years of imprisonment. 94 It also eliminated
judicial recommendations against deportation for any conviction. 95
Significantly, the Immigration Act of 1990 (“IMMACT90”) also began a
long process of restricting and streamlining procedures for adjudicating
cases involving the recently created and already expanding category of
aggravated felonies. For example, IMMACT90 section 504 provided for
mandatory detention of all aggravated felons except lawful permanent
residents pending the outcome of deportation proceedings. 96 IMMACT90
also required states, as a way of facilitating identification and immigration
prosecution of those convicted of crimes, to establish a plan to provide the
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) 97 with certified records of
conviction within thirty days of any conviction under state law. 98
A few years later, Congress made further efforts to streamline the
deportation process for individuals convicted of aggravated felonies in the
Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994. 99 For the first
time, this Act gave the Attorney General the considerable power to bypass
deportation proceedings entirely for any noncitizen who was not a lawful
permanent resident, who was convicted of an aggravated felony, and who
was ineligible for relief from deportation. 100 Individuals in this category
were deprived of the right to an administrative deportation hearing before
an immigration judge and permitted only limited judicial review of the
agency decision to determine whether they were, in fact, not lawful
permanent residents, not eligible for relief, and had been convicted of an
aggravated felony. 101 At the same time, Congress began a long process of
tightening connections between the criminal and immigration systems to
ensure that individuals who were deportable for convictions were directly
identified and deported. 102
In the same year, through the Immigration and Nationality Technical
Corrections Act of 1994, Congress took the radical step of giving federal
criminal sentencing judges jurisdiction in certain circumstances to issue an
order of deportation based on a criminal conviction at the same time as the
sentencing, thereby bypassing entirely a separate deportation process. 103
94
Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101‐649, § 501, 104 Stat. 4978, 5048
[hereinafter IMMACT90]; id. § 511, 104 Stat. at 5052.
95
Id. § 505, 104 Stat. at 5050.
96
Id. § 504, 104 Stat. at 5049‐50.
97
The INS was the predecessor of the current DHS’s United States Citizenship and
Immigration Service, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), and Customs and Border
Protection (CBP).
98
IMMACT90 § 507, 104 Stat. at 5050‐51.
99
Pub. L. No. 103‐322, 108 Stat. 1796 (1994) [hereinafter Violent Crime Act].
100
Id. § 130,004, 108 Stat. at 2026.
101
Id.
102
See, e.g., id. § 130,002, 108 Stat. at 2023.
103
Immigration and Nationality Technical Corrections Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103‐416,
§ 224, 108 Stat. 4305, 4322‐24 (1994).
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Congress also significantly expanded the definition of “aggravated felony”
again, so that the definition now included sixteen different offenses
ranging from failure to appear to serve a sentence of fifteen years or more
to murder, 104 and expanded the grounds for deportation and exclusion for
many crimes to include attempts and conspiracies to commit those
crimes. 105
Up to this time, Congress had significantly expanded the criminal
grounds for deportation and exclusion and had begun to address the
problem of identification and enforcement against noncitizens with
convictions. However, in 1996, Congress substantially overhauled the way
that immigration law had previously treated individuals with convictions
when it passed AEDPA and IIRIRA.
These two laws together revolutionized the way that convictions
were addressed by the immigration system. 106 They redefined and
substantially broadened (again) the universe of crimes for which one could
be removed from the United States by expanding the definition of what
constitutes both a conviction and a term of imprisonment for immigration
purposes (including, for example, suspended sentences within the latter
for the first time). 107 They also broadened the definition of aggravated
felonies to include, among other things, any crime of theft or violence for
which a sentence of only one year was imposed. 108 The reach of current
INA provisions regarding crimes is extremely long. Noncitizens are
rendered removable or inadmissible for offenses involving moral
turpitude, 109 virtually any drug offense, 110 firearms offenses, 111 domestic
violence offenses, 112 and aggravated felonies. 113
The category of aggravated felony is in turn quite broad, and now
includes a “stunning range” of offenses, 114 many of which are neither
“aggravated” nor felonies. The list currently includes twenty separate
categories of charges, and encompasses a wide range of offenses, some of

104
Id. § 222, 108 Stat. at 4320‐22.
105
Id. §§ 203, 222, 108 Stat. at 4311, 4322.
106
IIRIRA even changed the very basic categories of deportation, eliminating
“deportation” and “exclusion” proceedings in favor of the single “removal” proceeding. See INA §
240(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a) (2006); IIRIRA, div. C, §§ 304, 309(d)(2), 110 Stat. at 3009‐587, 3009‐
627.
107
IIRIRA § 322(a)(1), 110 Stat. at 3009‐628 to 3009‐629.
108
Id. § 321(a)(3), 110 Stat. at 3009‐627.
109
INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(i)‐(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i)‐(ii) (2006); id. §
212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I).
110
Id. § 237(a)(2)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B); id. § 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(II), 8 U.S.C. §
1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II).
111
Id. § 237(a)(2)(C), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(C).
112
Id. § 237(a)(2)(E), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E).
113
Id. § 237(a)(2)(A)(iii), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii).
114
Legomsky, supra note 46, at 520.
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which are quite serious, but many of which are relatively minor. 115 Some
of the aggravated felony provisions are triggered by sentences of
incarceration of one year or more, but the inclusion of suspended
sentences within this definition means that even sentences with no actual
jail time can trigger the aggravated felony provisions. 116 As a result,
“aggravated felony” offenses now include “simple” assault with a sentence
or suspended sentence of a year or more, 117 possession of marijuana with
intent to distribute (regardless of sentence), 118 and even petty theft with a
prior jail term, where a sentence or suspended sentence of a year or more
is imposed. 119 Congress further defined aggravated felony to include any
attempt or conspiracy to commit any of these crimes 120 as well as any such
conviction entered at any time, whether “before, on, or after the date of
enactment” of the new definition, meaning that offenses that were not
aggravated felonies or deportable offenses when they were committed
have become so. 121 Finally, AEDPA provided that any individual convicted
of an aggravated felony “shall be conclusively presumed to be deportable
from the United States.” 122
Even more significantly, IIRIRA eliminated the immigration judge’s
traditional power to exercise discretion on behalf of any individual with a
conviction that fell within the much‐expanded aggravated felony
definition. IIRIRA eliminated the traditional section 212(c) waiver 123
and—among other restrictions—replaced it with a much more limited
form of relief for which individuals with aggravated felony convictions
were made categorically ineligible. 124 The section 212(c) waiver, which
had provided discretionary relief from removal for many thousands of
individuals annually prior to 1996, was no longer. 125
Furthermore, AEDPA and IIRIRA included a variety of provisions that
significantly tightened the coordination between criminal and immigration
proceedings, to ensure that criminal defendants passed as directly as
possible from the state or federal criminal systems to removal
proceedings. For example, the Attorney General was directed to detain all
individuals convicted of virtually any crime upon their release from
115
INA § 101(a)(43)(A)‐(U), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(A)‐(U) (2006).
116
Id. § 101(a)(48)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48)(B).
117
See, e.g., United States v. Cordoza‐Estrada, 385 F.3d 56, 57 (1st Cir. 2004) (holding
that simple assault for punching a man in the face is an aggravated felony).
118
Julce v. Mukasey, 530 F.3d 30, 32 (1st Cir. 2008) (holding that possession of
marijuana with intent to distribute is an aggravated felony).
119
Mutascu v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 710, 711 (5th Cir. 2006).
120
INA § 101(a)(43)(U), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(U) (2006).
121
Id.
122
AEDPA § 442(c), 110 Stat. at 1280.
123
IIRIRA § 304(b), 110 Stat. at 3009‐597.
124
Id. § 304(a), 110 Stat. at 3009‐587 to 3009‐597; see also INA § 240a(a)(3), 8 U.S.C. §
1229b(a)(3) (2006).
125
Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 296 (2001).
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incarceration, parole, supervised release, or probation, and was directed to
hold them, with no possibility of release on bond, pending removal
proceedings and after an order of removal. 126 Thus, after this provision
went into effect in 1998, any removable individual incarcerated even for a
short time was subject to mandatory detention until the government could
complete removal proceedings and effectuate removal. AEDPA also
broadened provisions for holding expedited removal proceedings for
convicted individuals while they are still serving their criminal
sentences. 127 IIRIRA expanded the jurisdiction of federal district court
judges to enter removal orders at the time of criminal sentencing. Where
earlier law had given them jurisdiction to order removal only in cases
involving aggravated felony convictions, IIRIRA gave a district court
sentencing judge the power to order the removal of any alien “who is
deportable.” 128 It also wrote into statute the authority of sentencing judges
to enter a removal order as a condition of probation. 129 Finally, Congress
ordered immigration authorities to continue to develop systems to identify
and track noncitizens with convictions, including a criminal alien
identification system that would be used to help local, state, and federal
law enforcement identify and locate noncitizens subject to removal
because of convictions. 130
III. The Directness of Immigration Consequences in the Current Legal
Framework
The calculus for all of the factors considered by earlier courts in
analyzing the directness of immigration consequences—definiteness,
immediacy, the automatic nature of the sanction, and the independence of
the decision‐maker—has been changed by the revolution in immigration
law and enforcement that has occurred gradually over the course of the
last two decades. An analysis of the current landscape of immigration law
and enforcement relating to convictions reveals that removal does, in fact,
function as punishment, and, at least in the case of those convicted of
aggravated felonies, has come to a point where it can very fairly be
characterized as the definite, immediate, and automatic consequence of
the criminal court’s action.

126
IIRIRA § 303(a), 110 Stat. at 3009‐585 to 3009‐587.
127
AEDPA § 442, 110 Stat. at 1279‐80.
128
IIRIRA § 374, 110 Stat. at 3009‐647 to 3009‐648; INA § 238(c)(1), 8 U.S.C. §
1228(c)(1) (2006).
129
IIRIRA § 374, 110 Stat. at 3009‐647 to 3009‐648.
130
Violent Crime Act § 130,002, 108 Stat. at 2023, amended by AEDPA, tit. IV, § 432, 110
Stat. at 1273; IIRIRA, div. C, tit. III, §§ 308(g)(5)(B), 326, 327, 110 Stat. at 3009‐623, 3009‐630.
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Removal as a Punitive Sanction

As we have seen, courts have consistently held that deportation is a
remedial rather than punitive sanction. Earlier courts addressing the
directness of the deportation consequences of conviction concluded that
deportation was “neither ‘definite’ nor ‘largely automatic,’” 131 and that it
was the result of the independent action of a government agency that was,
in turn, independent of the criminal court. As such, these courts held
deportation to be a collateral consequence of conviction. 132 The Daley
court, for example, relied specifically on the availability of discretionary
relief in separate, substantive immigration proceedings, as well as the
uncertainties of enforcement. 133 Indeed, in that time period, the eventual
outcome of deportation was contingent on the happenstance of whether
the individual came to the attention of the immigration authorities, who
had few systems to identify him, and whether they instituted proceedings
against him, as well as whether the individual qualified by his
circumstances for a section 212(c) waiver or other discretionary relief
from deportation.
However, if we vigorously analyze the nature of the removal sanction
and apply the “definite, immediate and largely automatic effect” 134
standard used by earlier courts to immigration consequences as they
operate today, the conclusion is very different. We find that removal in fact
functions as punishment and that immigration law and its enforcement
infrastructure have changed to such an extent in the past two decades that
removal has become a direct consequence of many convictions for
noncitizens. This is particularly true for anyone convicted of any of the
myriad offenses now classified as aggravated felonies by the immigration
law.
Courts continue to state without argument that removal universally
serves a remedial purpose and is imposed to remedy an ongoing violation
of the immigration law. 135 This characterization of the sanction certainly
applies in the case of some immigration violations. For example, a student
visa is issued on the condition that the student be enrolled full‐time in
school. 136 When an individual with such a visa fails to enroll in school (or
to enroll full‐time), she has violated the terms of her admission and
continues to violate those terms as long as she remains in the country on

131
Daley v. State, 487 A.2d 320, 322 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1985).
132
See United States v. Littlejohn, 224 F.3d 960, 965 (9th Cir. 2000); United States v.
Lambros, 544 F.2d 962, 966 (8th Cir. 1976); Fruchtman v. Kenton, 531 F.2d 946, 949 (9th Cir.
1976); Daley, 487 A.2d at 322.
133
Daley, 487 A.2d at 322.
134
Cuthrell v. Director, 475 F.2d 1364, 1366 (4th Cir. 1973).
135
See, e.g., Reno v. Am.‐ Arab Anti‐Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 491 (1999).
136
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(F) (2006).

68

6 SWEENEY.DOC

1/4/2010 12:44 PM

Fact or Fiction
her student visa without being enrolled in school. The same can be said for
an individual who is admitted to the country in order to work for a
particular employer and fails to do so. In a slightly different way, the same
can also be said for one who enters without inspection, because (though
there has been no legal entry) the violation is likewise ongoing. In these
contexts, it makes sense to say that removal remediates an ongoing
violation of the immigration law.
The same reasoning does not apply to an individual who is legally
authorized to be in the country and whose removability arises solely from
the fact that she has been convicted of a criminal offense. In that case, the
ground of removability has no relation to the conditions of admission; the
criminal grounds of removal apply regardless of the type of visa or
conditions on the individual’s admission. Indeed, a number of the criminal
grounds of removal have no analogue in the provisions that govern
admission. For example, certain firearm offenses are grounds for
removability but not inadmissibility. 137 In fact, while many aggravated
felonies also fall within independent grounds of inadmissibility, the
aggravated felony ground of removal itself 138 has no counterpart in the
standards for admission.
Likewise, the finding of the violation in no way depends on any
ongoing conduct, threat, or requirement, but is satisfied by evidence of the
past act alone. The “remedial” nature of the sanction, according to the case
law, lies simply in the removal from the community of one who has
committed the past act. There is no claim that removal accomplishes any
other remedial purpose nor that there is any ongoing requirement or
condition that is being violated. Thus, in the context of removal for a
criminal conviction, despite the applied rhetoric of ongoing violations and
remedial sanctions, deportability is based on and justified by the past act
alone. As such, it functions as punishment for that act rather than as a
remedy for any ongoing violation of the immigration law.
B.

Removal as an Automatic Sanction for Aggravated Felony Convictions

As we have seen, changes in the immigration statutes have made
removal quite “definite, immediate and largely automatic” for any
individual convicted of an aggravated felony. The immigration
consequences of an aggravated felony conviction are categorical, arising
directly from the fact of the conviction, regardless of the severity of the
actual offense. The law states plainly that any “alien convicted of an
aggravated felony shall be conclusively presumed to be deportable from

137
138

INA § 237(a)(2)(C), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(C).
Id. § 237(a)(2)(A)(iii), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii).
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the United States.” 139 Furthermore, noncitizens convicted of aggravated
felonies are automatically and mandatorily disqualified from virtually any
discretionary relief from removal, including cancellation of removal for
lawful permanent residents, the form of relief that replaced the much
utilized section 212(c) waiver. 140 The fact of the conviction itself strips an
immigration judge of any power to grant relief from removal. Following
removal for an aggravated felony conviction, an individual is permanently
barred from reentering the United States. 141
As a result of the conclusive presumptions and disqualifications
written into the law, removal has become automatic for anyone with a
conviction falling within the category of aggravated felonies. Immigration
judges are powerless to do anything other than confirm the fact of the
conviction and order removal. In the 2002 case of United States v. Couto, 142
the Second Circuit put it thus:
Given [the 1996 immigration law] amendments, an alien convicted of an
aggravated felony is automatically subject to removal and no one—not the
judge, the INS, nor even the United States Attorney General—has any
discretion to stop the deportation. Therefore, Defendant argues, the
rationale behind the decisions in Parrino and Santelises—that deportation is
not a direct consequence because it is not automatic—no longer reflects the
state of the law. Instead, deportation today is an essentially certain,
automatic, and unavoidable consequence of an alien’s conviction for an
aggravated felony. 143

Five years later, in Zhang v. United States, 144 the same court went on
to say even more directly:

139
Id. § 238(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1228(c). More generally, the law provides that any “alien
convicted of an aggravated felony at any time after admission is deportable.” Id. §
237(a)(2)(A)(iii), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii).
140
Id. § 240A(a)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a)(3). In addition, individuals with these
convictions are specifically barred from seeking cancellation of removal for individuals who are
not legal permanent residents, special cancellation of removal for Central Americans under the
Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American Relief Act, voluntary departure, relief under the
battered spouse provisions of the Violence Against Women Act, naturalization, and, in most cases,
temporary protected status. See id. § 101(f)(8), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f)(8); id. § 240A(b)(1)(B), 8 U.S.C. §
1229b(b)(1)(B); id. § 240A(b)(1)(C), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(C); id. § 240B(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. §
1229c(a)(1); id. § 240B(b)(1)(C), 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(b)(1)(C); id. § 240A(b)(1)(B), 8 U.S.C. §
1229c(b)(1)(B); id. § 240A(b)(1)(C), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(C); 8 C.F.R. § 1240.65(a) (2009); 8
C.F.R. § 1244.4. They are even barred from humanitarian relief from persecution in the form of
asylum and, in many circumstances, the more limited withholding of removal, as well. See INA §
208(b)(2)(B)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(B)(i) (2006); id. § 208(b)(2)(A)(ii), 8 U.S.C. §
1158(b)(2)(A)(ii); id. § 241(b)(3)(C), 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(C); id. § 241(b)(3)(B)(ii), 8 U.S.C. §
1231(b)(3)(B)(ii).
141
Id. § 212(a)(9)(A)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(A)(i).
142
311 F.3d 179 (2d Cir. 2002).
143
Id. at 189‐90.
144
506 F.3d 162 (2d Cir. 2007).
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The passage of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act of 1996 (“IIRIRA”) and the Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), however, has altered the landscape of
immigration law, and deportation of aggravated felons is now automatic
and non‐discretionary. [S]ee also INS v. St. Cyr (referring to deportation of
aggravated felons as “certain”). 145

The court in both cases found that it did not have to decide the issue
of directness, 146 but observed in dictum that it found merit in the
argument that the consequence of deportation was now automatic for
individuals with aggravated felony convictions. 147
C.

Removal as a Definite and Immediate Sanction

On the mandate of and with considerable support from Congress,
immigration and criminal authorities have collaborated on systems that
have made removal both definite and immediate. Removal now generally
follows right on the heels of the criminal process and sentence, often even
before the sentence has been served. Earlier courts found that removal
was neither definite nor immediate following a conviction, observing the
dumb luck that seemed to determine whether an individual with a
conviction would come to the attention of the authorities or not and the
long delays between conviction and deportation, when it did occur. 148 In
contrast, significant systems now ensure that noncitizen criminal
defendants are identified quickly and move directly and immediately to
immigration proceedings or even straight to removal, and DHS has
prioritized the removal of noncitizens with convictions. 149 DHS is required
by law to take custody of an individual with a removable conviction
directly upon his or her release from state or local custody, and the
145
Id. at 167 (first citation omitted).
146
In Couto, the court held that the defendant was entitled to withdraw her plea
because she was misled by her counsel. 311 F.3d at 188. In Zhang, the court found that the
defendant was, in fact, advised by the court of possible immigration consequences of his plea and
remanded for further proceedings on the question of ineffective assistance of counsel. 506 F.3d at
169.
147
Zhang, 506 F.3d at 167; Couto, 311 F.3d at 189‐90.
148
See Daley v. State, 487 A.2d 320, 322 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1985). The Daley court
observed that deportation proceedings in that case were not necessarily “immediate,” as the
defendant in Daley only came to the attention of the immigration authorities and was put into
deportation proceedings nearly two years after he pled guilty, when he happened to reenter the
country after travel abroad. Id. The court observed that proceedings “might never have been
instituted” had he not left the country. Id.
149
See, e.g., Oversight of the Department of Homeland Security: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. (2009) (statement of Janet Napolitano, Sec’y of Homeland
Sec.), available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/hearings/testimony.cfm?renderforprint=1&id=3803
&wit_id=7873 (“These new [enforcement] protocols reflect a renewed Department‐wide focus on
two different emphases for our immigration enforcement efforts: first, targeting criminal aliens,
and second targeting employers who cultivate illegal workplaces . . . .”).
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government has sophisticated systems in place to identify and keep track
of these individuals even while they are still serving their criminal
sentences. 150
Beginning with the reforms of the 1990s, immigration authorities
have been required to implement and maintain extensive systems to
tighten the connections between the formerly separate criminal and
immigration enforcement infrastructures. 151 Congress has generously
funded these mandates. 152 As a result, through a number of programs
designed to address different aspects of this interaction, the Department of
Homeland Security now has established a “Comprehensive Plan to Identify
and Remove Criminal Aliens.” 153 The goal of this web of enforcement
programs is to ensure that all individuals in any stage of the criminal
process—from the moment of a law enforcement stop through the
sentencing of a convicted individual and even beyond the completion of a
sentence—are screened for removability and, if appropriate, surrendered
into U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) custody. 154 The
development of these systems for identifying and processing “criminal
aliens” has been and continues to be among the highest priorities for
ICE. 155
This “Secure Communities” initiative, which ICE unveiled in 2008,
identifies and draws together many of the components of the
comprehensive system that immigration authorities have developed over
the years, in conjunction with federal, state, and local law enforcement and
others, to identify and process noncitizens with convictions. The plan is the
culmination of several years of serious investment by ICE in an
infrastructure that is “transforming the way the federal government
cooperates with state and local law enforcement agencies to identify,

150
Id.
151
For one example, under INA section 236(d), DHS is required to implement and
maintain a computer‐based system to identify aliens in state and local custody who have been
arrested for aggravated felonies and to facilitate communication with federal authorities
regarding the arrest, conviction, and release of such individuals. INA § 236(d), 8 U.S.C. § 1226(d)
(2006).
152
It does not appear that support for these programs will diminish anytime soon. The
federal budget recently proposed by the Obama Administration would include $1.4 billion
designated specifically for ICE programs to deport noncitizens who commit crimes. How the $3.6
Trillion Would Be Spent, WASH. POST, Feb. 27, 2009, at A7.
153
See U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, Secure Communities (Nov. 19, 2008)
(on file with The Yale Journal on Regulation) [hereinafter ICE Fact Sheet].
154
Id.
155
U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, ICE FISCAL YEAR 2007 ANNUAL REPORT:
PROTECTING NATIONAL SECURITY AND UPHOLDING PUBLIC SAFETY 4–5 (2008), available at
http://www.ice.gov/doclib/about/ice07ar_final.pdf [hereinafter ICE FISCAL YEAR 2007 ANNUAL
REPORT] (“At the same time, ICE has introduced an aggressive and effective campaign to enforce
immigration law within the nation’s interior, with a top‐level focus on criminal aliens . . . . Aliens
involved in criminal activity are a threat to the safety and security of the American public and
were a key focus for ICE in FY07.”).
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detain and remove all criminal aliens held in custody.” 156 ICE has
coordinated enforcement efforts among myriad agencies at all levels of
government in this effort. In addition to state and local law enforcement
agencies, 157 its federal partners in this effort include U.S. Citizenship and
Immigration Services (USCIS), Customs and Border Protection (CBP), and
the United States Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology (US‐
VISIT) Program within DHS, as well as agencies beyond DHS: the Bureau of
Prisons (BOP), the Executive Office for Immigration Review, U.S. Attorneys,
the Department of State (DOS), the Department of Justice, the U.S. Marshals
Service, and the FBI’s Criminal Justice Information Services Division. 158
In June 2007, ICE consolidated its efforts and resources into its
Criminal Alien Program (CAP), charged with identifying, detaining, and
removing noncitizens with convictions. 159 CAP uses a variety of programs
to screen inmates in federal, state, and local prisons and jails throughout
the country, to place DHS detainers on them to ensure that they pass
directly to DHS custody, and to secure removal orders against them before
they can be released from the custody of the criminal system. In fiscal year
2008, CAP officers issued charging documents to begin removal
proceedings against more than 221,000 noncitizens with convictions. This
was a significant increase from 164,000 in fiscal year 2007 and 67,000 in
fiscal year 2006. 160
The Detention Enforcement and Processing Offenders by Remote
Technology (DEPORT) Center in Chicago uses video teleconference
equipment to interview federal BOP inmates for immigration screening
and to begin proceedings. As a result of the DEPORT Center and local ICE
efforts, inmates from all 114 federal detention centers are now screened
and taken directly into ICE custody, if appropriate, upon completion of
their sentences. 161 Together, CAP and DEPORT officers also currently
screen all foreign‐born individuals in all state prisons. 162
In addition, from the time any state, local, or federal law enforcement
officer stops an individual, that officer has access to ICE’s Law Enforcement
Support Center (LESC), a national enforcement operations facility that
provides the officer with real‐time immigration status and identity
information twenty‐four hours a day, seven days a week, even when the

156
ICE Fact Sheet, supra note 153.
157
For a window into the growing cooperative relationship between ICE and New York,
see N.Y. DIV. OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE SERVS., CRIMINAL ALIEN IMPROVEMENTS IN NEW YORK STATE: 2006
CRIMESTAT
UPDATE
(2007),
available
at
http://criminaljustice.state.ny.us/pio/annualreport/criminalalienimprovements.pdf.
158
See ICE Fact Sheet, supra note 153.
159
Id.
160
Id.
161
ICE FISCAL YEAR 2007 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 155; ICE Fact Sheet, supra note 153.
162
ICE Fact Sheet, supra note 153.
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individual has not been arrested. 163 Prior immigration and criminal
history data are available even if the individual is merely subject to a traffic
or other stop and is accessible by any law enforcement officer in any case,
including in the case of individuals charged and held in local jails. In fiscal
year 2008, LESC responded to 807,106 requests for information from
other law enforcement agencies which came from 12,000 different sources
including agencies in all fifty states and the District of Columbia. 164 Over
the past five fiscal years, LESC agents lodged 79,450 immigration detainers
against individuals with convictions or prior immigration violations. 165
In addition, LESC administers the 250,000 ICE records in the National
Crime Information Center database, which gives local law enforcement
officers direct access to immigration‐related records. 166 ICE is also
working on establishing interoperability between the FBI’s Integrated
Automated Fingerprint Identification System and DHS’s Automated
Biometric Identification System, which will facilitate the positive
identification of individuals in local prisons and jails. 167
As soon as foreign‐born individuals with convictions are identified in
the criminal system, DHS places a detainer on them to ensure that they are
surrendered directly into DHS custody. If the individual has not earlier had
a removal hearing, proceedings to remove him or her are begun in most
cases after the individual goes into DHS custody on the detainer. 168
Furthermore, individuals with virtually any criminal conviction are
subject to mandatory detention during the pendency of their removal
proceedings, 169 and federal law requires that the DHS 170 “shall” take them
into custody immediately upon their release from state custody, including
release on parole, supervised release, or probation. 171 This ensures that
these individuals are unable to abscond or to avoid being subjected to any
immigration process that might flow from their convictions.
163
U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, Law Enforcement Support Center (Nov.
19, 2008), http://www.ice.gov/pi/news/factsheets/lesc.htm.
164
Id.
165
Id.
166
Id.
167
Id.
168
Telephone Interviews and E‐mail Correspondence with Joanna Silver, Fed. Pub.
Defender, Dist. of Md. (Jan. 9, 2009); Laura Kelsey Rhodes, Private Criminal Def. Attorney (Jan. 9,
2009); Deirdre Mokos, Fed. Pub. Defender, Dist. of Ariz., Tucson Div. (Jan. 8, 2009) (any opinion
stated by Ms. Mokos is hers only and not that of the Federal Public Defender of Arizona); Laura
Harper, Fed. Pub. Defender, N. Dist. of Tex., Dallas Div. (Jan. 7, 2009); Frank Mangan, Fed. Pub.
Defender, S. Dist. of Cal., San Diego Div. (Jan. 6, 2009) (on file with The Yale Journal on Regulation).
169
INA § 236(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) (2006) (providing for mandatory detention of
anyone removable or inadmissible for convictions of crimes involving moral turpitude, aggravated
felonies, drug offenses, firearms, and “miscellaneous” offenses).
170
With the transfer of authority under 6 U.S.C. § 557 as of March 1, 2003, the title
“Attorney General” refers to the Secretary of Homeland Security with respect to certain federal
law. United States v. Rios‐Zamora, 153 F. App’x 517, 520‐21 (10th Cir. 2005).
171
INA § 236(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) (2006).
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In many cases, immigration removal proceedings are begun and even
completed before an individual leaves state or federal custody. Current law
provides for removal proceedings to be held in correctional facilities for
those with aggravated felony convictions, in an effort to ensure that
proceedings are completed while the individual is still serving his or her
sentence for the criminal charge and that removal can occur directly upon
the individual’s release to DHS custody. 172 These proceedings take place
through the ICE Institutional Removal Program (IRP), which is the vehicle
for this overlap between criminal and immigration enforcement. The
number of individuals receiving an order of removal while serving a
criminal sentence has increased markedly in recent years. 173
Even beyond the IRP, though, there is the so‐called “administrative”
removal process for individuals with aggravated felony convictions who
are not lawful permanent residents. 174 The INA provides that any such
individual may be ordered removed by a DHS employee in a summary and
strictly administrative process without any hearing or removal proceeding
at all. 175 This streamlined “process” is reduced to a ministerial function by
two other sections of the statute that provide that any individual with an
aggravated felony conviction is “conclusively presumed” deportable on the
basis of the conviction alone 176 and, again on the basis of the conviction
alone, specifically made ineligible for any discretionary forms of relief. 177
Thus, the role of the decision‐maker in these cases, a DHS employee, is
merely to confirm the identity of the individual and the existence of the
conviction. From the fact of that conviction, the law mandates that the
individual is deportable and has no discretionary relief and therefore must
be ordered removed. Though DHS refers to these orders as

172
Id. § 238(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1228(a).
173
BOP employee Kathy Grinley is quoted in the ICE Fiscal Year 2007 Annual Report as
saying, “During the past year, there has been a noticeable increase in the number of inmates in
BOP custody who have received an order of removal while serving their sentence.” ICE FISCAL YEAR
2007 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 155, at 6.
174
See INA § 238(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1228(b) (2006). It is also noteworthy that this provision
can be applied to the conditional permanent resident spouse of a U.S. citizen, that is, an individual
granted adjustment of status to permanent residence within two years of marriage to a citizen. Id.
§ 238(b)(2)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1228(b)(2)(B). Such an individual has the same rights as a lawful
permanent resident to reside, work and reenter the United States, but must apply to remove the
condition on her residence after two additional years of marriage. Id. § 216, 8 U.S.C. § 1186(a).
Though conditional permanent residents are considered the equivalent of lawful permanent
residents for many purposes, the Board of Immigration Appeals has held that they can be
subjected to summary administrative removal just like undocumented individuals. See, e.g., In re
Spitzauer, No. A73‐446‐031, 2004 WL 1739208 (B.I.A. July 16, 2004).
175
See INA § 238(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1228(b) (2006).
176
Id. § 238(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1228(c) (“Presumption of deportability. An alien convicted of
an aggravated felony shall be conclusively presumed to be deportable from the United States.”).
177
Id. § 238(b)(5), 8 U.S.C. § 1228(b)(5) (“No alien described in this section shall be
eligible for any relief from removal that the Attorney General may grant in the Attorney General’s
discretion.”).
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“administrative” orders of removal, 178 one commentator has suggested
that they are more accurately called “ministerial” orders because the order
is entered following the unilateral exercise of a purely ministerial function
on the part of the DHS employee. 179 In fiscal year 2007, 4242 individuals
were administratively ordered removed for criminal convictions without a
hearing. 180 The number of these ministerial or administrative orders of
removal entered by DHS employees has risen over the years and rose
sharply in fiscal year 2008 to 6514. 181
Finally, criminal courts themselves are now facilitating the initiation
of removal proceedings and, in some cases, actually entering removal
orders directly. It is now “routine” in many federal districts, especially
those with high foreign‐born populations, for judges to order surrender to
immigration officials as a condition of supervised release or at the end of
any period of incarceration. 182 In cases involving plea bargains,
prosecutors often require defendants to stipulate to removal or
reinstatement of removal in order to benefit from a “fast track” plea or
otherwise strike a deal for the quickest processing and the shortest
incarceration. 183 In many districts, defendants are “routinely” required to
waive their right to contest removal proceedings as part of a plea
agreement. 184 One such agreement contained the following provisions:

178
See ICE FISCAL YEAR 2007 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 155, at 33.
179
Lenni B. Benson, Back to the Future: Congress Attacks the Right to Judicial Review of
Immigration Proceedings, 29 CONN. L. REV. 1411, 1446 n.167 (1997), cited in Margaret H. Taylor &
Ronald F. Wright, The Sentencing Judge as Immigration Judge, 51 EMORY L.J. 1131, 1157 n.103
(2002); see also United States v. Couto, 311 F.3d 179, 190 n.10 (2d Cir. 2002).
180
See ICE FISCAL YEAR 2007 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 155, at 33.
181
U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, ICE FISCAL YEAR 2008 ANNUAL REPORT:
PROTECTING NATIONAL SECURITY AND UPHOLDING PUBLIC SAFETY 28 (2009), available at
http://www.ice.gov/doclib/pi/reports/ice_annual_report/pdf/ice08ar_final.pdf [hereinafter ICE
FISCAL YEAR 2008 ANNUAL REPORT].
182
Telephone Interviews and E‐mail Correspondence with Joanna Silver, Fed. Pub.
Defender, Dist. of Md. (Jan. 8, 2009); Laura Harper, Fed. Pub. Defender, N. Dist. of Tex., Dallas Div.
(Jan. 7, 2009) (on file with The Yale Journal on Regulation); see United States v. Osbaldo Lopez‐
Becerra, No. 08‐CR‐1309‐LRR, 2008 WL 2557455 (N.D. Iowa Oct. 9, 2008).
183
Telephone Interviews and E‐mail Correspondence with Joanna Silver, Fed. Pub.
Defender, Dist. of Md. (Jan. 9, 2009); Deirdre Mokos, Fed. Pub. Defender, Dist. of Ariz., Tucson Div.
(Jan. 8, 2009); Frank Mangan, Fed. Pub. Defender S. Dist. of Cal., San Diego Div. (Jan. 6, 2009) (on
file with The Yale Journal on Regulation). The vast majority of criminal cases are disposed of
through plea agreements. In 2004, 57% of federal felony charges and 95% of state felony charges
were disposed of by means of a negotiated plea agreement. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T
OF JUSTICE, FELONY DEFENDANTS IN LARGE URBAN COUNTIES, 2004 ‐ STATISTICAL TABLES tbl.19 (2008),
available
at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/html/fdluc/2004/tables/fdluc04st19.htm;
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, STATE COURT SENTENCING OF CONVICTED FELONS
2004
‐
STATISTICAL
TABLES
tbl.4.1
(2007),
available
at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/html/scscf04/tables/scs04401tab.htm.
184
E‐mail Correspondence with Andre Davis, Fed. Dist. Court Judge, Dist. of Md. (Jan. 8,
2009) (on file with The Yale Journal on Regulation); Telephone Interviews and E‐mail
Correspondence with Laura Harper, Fed. Pub. Defender, N. Dist. of Tex., Dallas Div. (Jan. 8, 2009);
(on file with The Yale Journal on Regulation).
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Consent to Removal from the United States
11. The Defendant acknowledges that he is subject to removal from the
United States and agrees not to contest any removal proceedings brought
by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). . . . [T]he Defendant agrees
to request an expedited removal hearing and to consent to removal. . . . The
Defendant knowingly waives any and all rights to appeal, reopen,
reconsider or otherwise challenge his removal.
12. The Defendant agrees to waive any rights he may have to apply for any
form of relief or protection from removal. . . .
14. The Defendant agrees to assist the DHS in his removal. 185

The plea agreement in these cases acts as a binding contract between
the defendant and the U.S. Attorney’s Office and prevents the defendant
from fighting removal in immigration court. 186
In any event, even when a plea agreement does not directly address
immigration status, whenever it comes to the attention of the court or
prosecution that a defendant is a noncitizen, it is the practice of the U.S.
Attorney’s Office to notify ICE so that agents can screen and put a detainer
on the individual if ICE believes him or her to be removable. 187 Individuals
with detainers are then transferred directly into the custody of
immigration officials at the end of their sentence or criminal process. The
system, especially in federal district courts, has become extremely efficient
at identifying and detaining removable defendants. One federal defender in
Tucson, Arizona estimated that in eight years of working as a federal
public defender, she has seen exactly one of her noncitizen former clients
mistakenly released following his sentencing; to her knowledge all the rest
had detainers by the time they came to her for representation and were
surrendered directly to immigration authorities afterwards. 188
The law allows for even more direct involvement of a federal criminal
district court in the process of imposing removal as a result of a criminal
conviction. Since the mid‐1990s, the INA has provided that a federal
district court judge can enter a judicial order of removal directly against
any individual convicted of any deportable criminal offense in the course
of the criminal proceeding itself. 189 There is no provision in these cases for
any separate DHS administrative or hearing process whatsoever. If the
185
E‐mail Correspondence with Andre Davis, Fed. Dist. Court Judge, Dist. of Md. (Jan. 8,
2009) (on file with The Yale Journal on Regulation).
186
E‐mail Correspondence with Frank Mangan, Fed. Pub. Defender, S. Dist. of Cal., San
Diego Div. (Jan. 6, 2009) (on file with The Yale Journal on Regulation).
187
Telephone Interviews with Joanna Silver, Fed. Pub. Defender, Dist. of Md. (Jan. 9,
2009); Laura Kelsey Rhodes, Private Criminal Def. Attorney (Jan. 9, 2009); Laura Harper, Fed. Pub.
Defender, N. Dist. of Tex., Dallas Div. (Jan. 7, 2009); Frank Mangan, Fed. Pub. Defender, S. Dist. of
Cal., San Diego Div. (Jan. 6, 2009) (on file with The Yale Journal on Regulation).
188
Telephone Interview with Deirdre Mokos, Fed. Pub. Defender, Dist. of Ariz., Tucson
Div. (Jan. 8, 2009) (on file with The Yale Journal on Regulation).
189
INA § 238(c)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1228(c)(1) (2006).
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conviction is the result of a plea rather than a trial, the sentencing judge
may enter a stipulated order of removal negotiated as part of a plea
agreement. 190 Additionally, a district court or magistrate judge has
statutory authority to order removal as a condition of probation. 191 In all
of these cases, the district court itself enters an order of removal directly at
the time of sentencing for the underlying criminal offense, and the
individual is transferred without further proceedings to DHS for removal
upon completion of any sentence for the criminal charge.
This power of judicial removal was used in the rather notorious
proceedings that followed the ICE raid of the Agriprocessors, Inc.
meatpacking plant in Postville, Iowa in May 2008. Over the course of ten
days in Postville, nearly three hundred workers from the plant were
arrested, pled guilty, were convicted of document fraud charges, and were
sentenced. 192 Following the entry of sentence in each case, the court
issued a stipulated order requiring the removal of the defendant from the
United States. 193 The final order of removal was entered directly by the
criminal sentencing judge, and no further proceedings were required or
conducted by any immigration authorities.
D.

Removal as a Sanction Imposed Without Independent Due Process

Finally, a key factor—seemingly in many cases the key factor—for
many courts addressing the directness question is that the deportation
decision has been made in the context of a separate, civil proceeding and
not within the criminal trial. The centrality of this factor can be seen in
many of the older cases. 194
It is striking, however, how this one factor has come to dominate the
analysis of courts that have considered the question of the directness of
removal following the 1996 changes to the immigration laws. As removal
has become demonstrably more “definite, immediate and largely
automatic,” courts have backed away from consideration of the full
standard for directness as originally applied and have come to focus
almost exclusively on the fact that removal is not imposed by the criminal
190
Id. § 238(c)(5), 8 U.S.C. § 1228(c)(5).
191
18 U.S.C. § 3563(b)(21) (2006).
192
Julia Preston, 270 Immigrants Sent to Prison in Federal Push, N.Y. TIMES, May 24,
2008, at A1; ICE News Release, 297 Convicted and Sentenced Following ICE Worksite Operation in
Iowa (May 15, 2008), http://www.ice.gov/pi/news/newsreleases/articles/080515waterloo.htm.
193
See, e.g., United States v. Vega‐Nava, No. CR 08‐1257 (N.D. Iowa May 22, 2008);
United States v. Lastor‐Gomez, No. CR 08‐1141 (N.D. Iowa May 19, 2008).
194
See, e.g., Fruchtman v. Kenton, 531 F.2d 946, 949 (9th Cir. 1976); Michel v. United
States, 507 F.2d 461, 465 (2d Cir. 1974) (“The district judge, in our view, has the obligation to
ascertain that the consequences of the sentence he imposes are understood. Deportation here, as
before, was not the sentence of the court which accepted the plea but of another agency over
which the trial judge has no control and for which he has no responsibility.”); Daley v. State, 487
A.2d 320, 322 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1985).
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court. The Sixth Circuit, for example, in ElNobani v. United States, 195
sidestepped the question of automaticity by stating without evidence that
“although the INS has been restricted in its ability to grant certain
discretionary relief in deportation proceedings, ‘there is no indication that
the INS has ceased making this sort of determination on a case‐by‐case
basis.’” 196 In any case, the court went on to hold, “the automatic nature of
the deportation proceeding does not necessarily make deportation a direct
consequence of the guilty plea. A collateral consequence is one that
‘remains beyond the control and responsibility of the district court in
which that conviction was entered.’” 197 Other courts have focused
similarly on the nominal independence of the deportation decision‐
maker. 198 In fact, every single federal circuit court of appeals that has held
that deportation continues to be a collateral consequence in the wake of
the 1996 changes has relied solely on the fact that the final removal order
is entered by an agency other than the sentencing court, regardless of how
definite, immediate, or automatic the sanction is. 199 None of these courts
has mentioned or addressed the statutory procedures for judicial removal
by federal sentencing judges under INA section 238(c)(1), and these
decisions were issued prior to the mass judicial removals of the 2008
Agriprocessing case. In the absence of such consideration, these courts
have simply stated that removal continues to be imposed by an
independent, civil agency and, as such, is collateral.
The forum of the removal decision is presumably a significant factor
for these courts because it reflects the independent judgment and action of
another decision‐making entity which considers factors outside the
province of the sentencing court and exercises some independent
judgment on factors relating specifically to the question of removal. This
intervention presumably assures the court that there is some kind of
195
287 F.3d 417 (6th Cir. 2002).
196
Id. at 421 (citing Reno v. Am.‐Arab Anti‐Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 484 n.8
(1999) (making the same statement without citing any factual evidence or explaining any
statutory basis for the claim that deportation proceedings continue to be decided on a case‐by‐
case basis despite the new restrictions)).
197
Id. (citing United States v. Gonzalez, 202 F.3d 20, 27 (1st Cir. 2000)).
198
See, e.g., United States v. Amador‐Leal, 276 F.3d 511, 516 (9th Cir. 2002) (“[W]hether
an alien will be removed is still up to the INS. There is a process to go through, and it is wholly
independent of the court imposing sentence. . . . Removal is not part of the sentence . . . .”);
Gonzalez, 202 F.3d at 27 (“However ‘automatically’ [the defendant’s] deportation . . . might follow
from his conviction, it remains beyond the control and responsibility of the district court in which
that conviction was entered and it thus remains a collateral consequence thereof.”); Rumpel v.
State, 847 So. 2d 399, 401 (Ala. Crim. App. 2002); People v. DeJesus, 819 N.Y.S.2d 442, 443‐
45 (Crim. Ct. 2006) (finding that immigration consequences are collateral despite their definite,
automatic nature because they are imposed by an “independent agency”).
199
Santos‐Sanchez v. United States, 548 F.3d 327, 337 (5th Cir. 2008); Broomes v.
Ashcroft, 358 F.3d 1251, 1256 (10th Cir. 2004); ElNobani, 287 F.3d at 421; AmadorLeal, 276 F.3d
at 516‐17; Gonzalez, 202 F.3d at 27; see also Francis, supra note 67, at 710 (arguing that courts
have allowed the certainty and severity of deportation to be trumped by the fact that it is imposed
by a court other than the sentencing court).
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substantive process in which other considerations are taken into account,
that is, the imposition of the consequence is not automatic, but
meaningfully considered in an appropriate setting. In the absence of some
meaningful independent consideration, it is difficult to see how or why this
single factor should carry all the weight of determining whether a
consequence is the direct result of a criminal court’s action, unless it is
simply a reflection of the fact that courts have been unwilling to break with
longstanding precedent that has denied constitutional significance to this
consequence or that they fear the practical implications of giving it
constitutional protection.
As we have seen, the link between criminal and immigration
enforcement continues to grow stronger with each passing year, and it can
no longer be said categorically that noncitizens convicted of crimes have
the benefit of a separate administrative removal hearing “wholly
independent of the court imposing sentence.” 200 Indeed, in the clearest
cases—those involving judicial removal under INA section 238(c)—the
removal order is, in fact, entered by the sentencing court. 201 The melding
of the criminal with the immigration process in these cases has gone the
last step in erasing any distinction between the criminal and immigration
courts; the immigration consequence is imposed as part of the criminal
process itself, by the same judge who enters the conviction and the
sentence. 202 There is, of course, no separate civil proceeding at all, and the
analysis of the circuit courts of appeal that have relied on this single factor
collapses in the face of the exercise of judicial removal power.
The Ninth Circuit has directly addressed the question of whether
judicial deportation under INA section 238(c) is a criminal or civil
proceeding, though in a different procedural setting. The question arose in
a petition by a former criminal defendant for attorneys’ fees under the
Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA) for his successful argument in
opposition to judicial deportation at criminal sentencing. 203 The petitioner
200
AmadorLeal, 276 F.3d at 516.
201
See, e.g., United States v. Lastor‐Gomez, No. CR 08‐1141 (N.D. Iowa May 19, 2008).
This case is one of 297 in which guilty pleas were entered and defendants were sentenced within
ten days in May 2008. ICE News Release, supra note 192. In each case, the district court, as part of
the sentencing, entered a stipulated judicial order of removal pursuant to INA section 238(c)(5), 8
U.S.C. § 1228(c)(5) (2006).
202
See Ethan Venner Torrey, “The Dignity of Crimes”: Judicial Removal of Aliens and the
CivilCriminal Distinction, 32 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 187, 199‐200 (1999) (arguing against the use
of judicial deportation on the grounds that it would so enmesh the criminal and immigration
processes as to require constitutional protections in both). “If deportation decisions are embodied
in plea agreements, however, as permitted by [INA section 238(c)], then deportation would
become part of ‘the sentence of the court which accepted the plea,’ and would emphatically not be
the decision of ‘another agency over which the trial judge has no control and for which he has no
responsibility.’ Deportation would therefore be a direct consequence of a criminal conviction.” Id.
(quoting Michel v. United States, 507 F.2d 461, 465 (2d Cir. 1974); United States v. George, 869
F.2d 333, 337 (7th Cir. 1989)).
203
United States v. Soueiti, 154 F.3d 1018 (9th Cir. 1998).
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argued that EAJA fees were appropriate because deportation proceedings
are civil in nature. The Ninth Circuit disagreed and held that in the context
of a judicial deportation (that is, deportation during criminal sentencing),
the deportation determination itself becomes criminal in nature:
In the procedural context of this case, [deportation] was criminal. That
context was a decision whether to order deportation as part of a criminal
sentencing proceeding. . . . The procedure for sentencing a criminal
defendant is criminal, regardless of whether some portions of the judgment,
such as deportation or restitution, might also be imposed in a civil
proceeding. 204

Interestingly, the court apparently did not find this to be a difficult
question, finding unanimously that the case was appropriate for resolution
without oral argument. 205
Judicial removal is the clearest illustration of the melding of the
criminal and immigration processes for those convicted of crimes, but the
other procedural permutations available to individuals convicted of
aggravated felonies lead just as inexorably to an order of removal. For non‐
permanent residents subjected to “administrative” or “ministerial”
removal, the sentencing judge may not order removal directly, but he or
she is the last one to make a substantive decision relevant to removal.
There is no other judicial or hearing process in any branch of government
to determine if these individuals should be removed. Rather, a DHS
employee simply confirms that the individual has an aggravated felony
conviction and, because of the conclusive presumption of deportability and
disqualification from any relief (both of which arise directly from the fact
of the conviction), may order the individual removed without a hearing of
any kind. 206
Even for those individuals who are still given an immigration hearing,
the decision‐maker there is also often restricted to an essentially
bureaucratic or clerical function of connecting the dots to a preordained
outcome. In the case of an individual with an aggravated felony conviction,
the immigration judge is as bound by operation of law as the DHS
employee imposing “administrative” removal orders to enter an order of
removal. There is no room for a finding that the individual is not

204
Id. at 1019.
205
Id. at 1018 n.*. On similar grounds, the Second Circuit had previously held that
proceedings to determine whether a criminal sentencing judge would issue a judicial
recommendation against deportation under pre‐1990 law were part of the criminal proceeding
and therefore subject to a Sixth Amendment guarantee of effective assistance of counsel. Janvier v.
United States, 793 F.2d 449, 452 (2d Cir. 1986).
206
INA § 238(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1228(b)‐(c) (2006).
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removable 207 and simply no legal option for the court to exercise its
discretion and find her eligible for some form of relief from removal. 208
Given that the significance of the independent forum for the removal
decision is presumably that it implies the existence of a separate process in
which factors relevant to the appropriateness of removal can be taken into
account, can it be meaningfully said that a removal hearing with a
preordained outcome constitutes a separate decision‐making process?
Addressing this question, the Second Circuit, in United States v. Couto, 209
dismissed the role of an immigration court following an aggravated felony
conviction as “ministerial.” The court observed that “when an event is a
certain consequence of a [prior] decision by a [sentencing] court, it is
meaningless to say that the [sentencing] court did not ordain that event;
any action by other institutions [is] purely ministerial.” 210 As discussed
above, the court found in Couto and in the subsequent case of Zhang v.
United States 211 that it did not have to decide the issue of directness, but
observed in dicta that it found merit in the argument that there was no
longer any independent court or body with power to affect the deportation
outcome in the case of aggravated felonies, and that these individuals have
lost any meaningful opportunity for a separate tribunal to make a
determination other than an order of removal. 212
IV. Removal as a Criminal Sanction
A.

Implications of Acknowledging Removal as Punishment for Crime

If courts acknowledge that the removal of lawful permanent residents
and other authorized noncitizens for criminal behavior constitutes
punishment and a direct consequence of a conviction, important
constitutional rights for noncitizen defendants will be implicated. These
include the right to trial and the effective assistance of counsel guaranteed
by the Sixth Amendment, as well as the right to be free of cruel and
unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment. In the context of plea
bargaining, the Constitution and Rule 11(b) of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure 213 would require that defendants be advised that
removal would be a consequence of certain pleas in order to knowingly
and voluntarily waive their Sixth Amendment right to trial. The Eighth
207
Id. § 238(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1228(c).
208
See supra Section III.B regarding the ineligibility of individuals with aggravated
felony convictions for any discretionary relief from removal.
209
311 F.3d 179 (2d Cir. 2002).
210
Id. at 190 n.10.
211
506 F.3d 162 (2d Cir. 2007).
212
Id. at 167; Couto, 311 F.3d at 190.
213
FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b).
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Amendment would require that removal be imposed only in such
circumstances that it would not be so disproportionate to the crime
committed as to be considered cruel and unusual. The practical difficulties
of administering this change in procedure and substantive rights would be
substantial.
Courts have taken on revolutions in criminal practice in the past, such
as in the wake of Gideon v. Wainwright, 214 when the Supreme Court read
the Sixth Amendment to require the appointment of counsel for indigent
criminal defendants. Surely, the logistical difficulty of ensuring
constitutional rights is no argument for not doing so.
Nevertheless, it is difficult as a practical matter to envision how state
and federal criminal courts around the country would accommodate the
recognition of these constitutional rights relating to immigration
consequences. The analysis of the exact immigration consequences of a
conviction is complex and technical. While the consequences of an
aggravated felony conviction are clear and automatic, there is sometimes a
question of law as to whether an offense falls within that category or
another, such as a crime involving moral turpitude. In non‐aggravated
felony cases, even if there is a finding of removability based on the
conviction, there is often a question of whether the individual may qualify
for some relief from removal. That eligibility depends in turn not only on
the nature of the conviction, but also on the individual defendant’s specific
immigration status and history, as well as any prior criminal history.
Expertise in matters at the intersection of criminal and immigration law is,
frankly, not nearly widespread enough in the bar or on the bench to
accommodate this need.
B.

Is Removal an Effective and Appropriate Sanction for Crime?

There is no reason to conclude automatically that it is either desirable
or undesirable to attach an inevitable sanction of removal for designated
criminal activity. As Stephen Legomsky points out, a combination of civil
and criminal penalties is imposed in a variety of contexts, 215 including tort
liability and civil forfeiture or penalties for conduct already punished as a
crime. 216 Given the substantial practical difficulties that would arise from
requiring constitutionally sufficient advice to be given to defendants on the
issue of immigration consequences in the criminal context, though, it is
appropriate to ask whether this particular system of double sanctions
serves important interests in an appropriate way and is thus worth the

214
372 U.S. 335 (1963).
215
Legomsky, supra note 46, at 519.
216
See also cases discussed supra Subsection I.B.2 (regarding the penal nature of
sanctions in civil proceedings).
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considerable trouble of accommodating the constitutional concerns it
raises. For reasons at least of proportionality and equity among similar
offenders, 217 I conclude that automatic removal is not a justifiable or
appropriate sanction for the broad range of convictions to which it now
applies. It is applied without reference to the true severity of the crime or
the myriad other factors that traditional sentencing courts consider in
tailoring punishment to a crime, and it results in grossly unequal sanctions
for similarly situated offenders, which raises serious fairness issues.
Removal could best be justified by two of the classic purposes of
punishment: incapacitation and retribution. The DHS publicizes its
program of deporting convicted individuals as a public safety measure,
describing “criminal aliens” as among the “worst of the worst.” 218 It argues
that removing individuals who have committed crimes reduces the
likelihood that others in the community will be victimized by crime. This is
essentially an argument for the incapacitation justification of
punishment—that the punishment keeps the individual from committing
another crime. Incapacitation of offenders has become a dominant theme
in the American response to crime generally, and has led us as a nation to a
model of crime control centered on the incarceration of large numbers of
people. 219 Rather than working on any theories of rehabilitation, this
approach operates on the assumption that once an individual has
committed a crime, society is better off spending its resources to separate
and protect itself from the individual, rather than to reintegrate that
individual into the fabric of the community. The removal (and subsequent
bar to readmission) of noncitizens convicted of crimes is a very satisfying
outcome within this theoretical framework, because (assuming no illegal
reentry) it provides a permanent separation of the wrongdoer from the
community, thereby providing maximum protection to society. 220 The
argument within this framework could be that, given a conflict of interests,
we would choose to value the interests of those individuals most
integrated into our community (citizens) at the expense of those who are
217
For a further discussion of these and other costs of the current system of crime‐
related deportations, see Legomsky, supra note 46, at 519.
218
ICE FISCAL YEAR 2008 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 181, at 3.
219
See, e.g., AM. BAR ASS’N, JUSTICE KENNEDY COMM’N, REPORTS WITH RECOMMENDATIONS TO
ABA
HOUSE
OF
DELEGATES
(2004),
available
at
THE
http://www.abanet.org/crimjust/kennedy/JusticeKennedyCommissionReportsFinal.pdf;
PEW
CTR. ON THE STATES, ONE IN 100: BEHIND BARS IN AMERICA 2008 (2008), available at
http://www.pewcenteronthestates.org/uploadedFiles/One%20in%20100.pdf.
220
This strategy begs the question, of course, of the effect of these deportations on the
receiving communities. One striking and problematic example of this strategy’s results is the
explosion of transnational gangs in Central America and the United States with the deportation of
individuals who were gang members in Los Angeles and other American cities. See, e.g., CLARE
RIBANDO SEELKE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS: GANGS IN CENTRAL AMERICA 2‐3
(2008), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL34112.pdf. The high number of
prosecutions each year for illegal reentry after removal also puts in question the removal
strategy’s true effectiveness.
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not citizens and thus not full members of the community (noncitizens
subject to removal).
The other most plausible justification for removal as punishment is
retribution, the idea that it is just to punish a wrongdoer simply because
wrongdoing deserves punishment. Under this rationale, it is morally fitting
that a wrongdoer should get his “just deserts”—that is, that he “should
suffer in proportion to his wrongdoing.” 221 This justification would seem
to fit with the automatic nature of removal for aggravated felonies and the
sanction’s indifference to the consequences of removal for the individual
or those around him.
Both incapacitation and retribution, though, are undermined as
justifications for automatic removal by its most striking feature as a form
of punishment—its complete divergence from the criminal system of
graduated and proportional penalties in sentencing. As Juliet P. Stumpf
points out in her thoughtful article, Penalizing Immigrants, criminal law
uses a complex system of graduated sanctions designed to fit the severity
of a crime’s punishment to the seriousness of the criminal behavior. 222
This system takes into consideration the circumstances and context of the
crime, the history of the defendant, and the impact on the victim. Its tools
include fines, community service, suspended sentences, parole, probation,
diversionary programs, varying lengths of incarceration, and even the
death penalty. 223 In one of the few ways immigration law has failed to
move closer to the criminal enforcement model, however, immigration law
still allows for only one sanction for almost any violation—removal. 224
Automatic removal is not calibrated in any way to the severity of the
underlying criminal offense. As a punishment, it is a very blunt instrument.
It is as if the criminal sentencing system were to impose a life sentence
without parole for any conviction, no matter how minor the conduct or
justifiable the circumstances surrounding the criminal activity. Removal is
a severe sanction, especially for a lawful permanent resident who will be
forced to leave behind all ties to the community in which she has made her
home, including family, career, business, property, friendships, and
community activities and connections. As an automatic sanction for an
aggravated felony, removal is the same for a murderer given a life sentence

221
See, e.g., LEO ZAIBERT, P UNISHMENT AND R ETRIBUTION 11 (2006) (quoting JOHN RAWLS,
Two Concepts of Rules, in C O LLECTED P APERS 21 (Samuel Freeman ed., 2001)).
Stumpf, supra note 47, at 264‐65.
222
223
See id. at 265.
224
Id. at 264. Stumpf proposes a system of graduated penalties in the immigration
context that would take into account the nature and facts surrounding the violation as well as the
individual’s status and stake in the United States. Possible sanctions might include an extension of
the waiting period for eligibility to naturalize, a finding and stay of removal (analogous to a
suspended sentence), a fine, or a period of probation in which any further violation would result in
deportation.
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as for a shoplifter who received a suspended sentence of one year (both of
whom are considered aggravated felons by the immigration law).
One of the key principles of retribution is that the punishment of the
wrongdoer must be in proportion to his desert, his moral responsibility for
the wrong. 225 Any system that automatically sanctions a murderer and a
shoplifter equally and without regard for the circumstances of the offenses
cannot be said to be proportional, and this disregard for proportionality in
turn completely undermines any meaningful justification of removal under
the very definition of retribution.
Incapacitation, on the other hand, is a utilitarian justification for
punishment, and is appropriate when the cost to the community of
incapacitation is outweighed by the additional safety accorded the
community through the absence of the wrongdoer. The widespread urge in
American society in the past few decades to “wall off” offenders fails to
take into account the many and complex connections these individuals
have in our communities and the cost—to the individual and to members
of the community—of thwarting or cutting off those connections. In the
case of noncitizens, the current regime of automatic removal includes no
meaningful review of the individual’s situation in the context of the
removal decision and thus has no mechanism to distinguish between
different levels of culpability (and possible future danger to the
community) or between different levels of connection between the
individual and the community. Under the current system, a newly arrived
undocumented person with no ties to the community is treated the same
as a longtime permanent resident who has lived most of his life in the
United States and has extensive connections with U.S. citizens, lawful
permanent resident family members, and other members of the
community. In fact, permanent residents often do have extensive ties to
family and community that are as important for the family and community
members as they are for the individual. Thus, it is often the U.S. citizen or
permanent resident children and spouse who are hurt most by the
deportation of their breadwinner.
This failure to distinguish or value varying levels of connection to the
community among immigrants reveals a philosophy of immigration that
maintains that all noncitizens are present in the country equally at the
mercy of the government, with no vested interest built through time,
connections, or integration into society. This understanding fails to
acknowledge the investment that lawful permanent residents and others
have and build over time in our communities.

225
MICHAEL MOORE, P LACING B LAME 88 (1997); John Rawls, Two Concepts of Rules, 64
PHIL. REV. 3, 4‐5 (1955) (“That a criminal should be punished follows from his guilt, and the
severity of the appropriate punishment depends upon the depravity of his act.”).
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If we acknowledge the investment of these longtime residents in our
community, it becomes clear that the sanction of removal, added to
whatever sanction the criminal court has already imposed for a conviction,
is an additional and very severe penalty. The inequality between that
double sanction and the criminal sanction alone imposed on the citizen is
manifest. The status of citizenship is the only distinction between a citizen
convicted of shoplifting and a lawful permanent resident with the same
conviction who has resided most of his or her life in the United States and
has significant community and family ties. The reality of the practical,
familial, economic, social, and psychological effects of permanent
banishment from the United States on either individual would be very
similar, yet we would be appalled at the idea of banishment as a
punishment for the citizen. If we look beyond the labels of “immigrant” and
“citizen” and fairly assess the effect that removal has on permanent
residents and on their vested interest in our society, we may very well find
that the thin line of citizenship or national origin cannot bear the weight of
such a distinction. The inequality between the two sanctions is manifestly
unjust.
Conclusion
The last two decades have seen changes in the immigration law and
the infrastructure of immigration enforcement that have fatally
undermined the longstanding legal constructions that have held
deportation to be a “collateral” and “remedial” consequence of a conviction
for lawfully authorized noncitizens. These changes render removal orders
the automatic result of aggravated felony convictions and have integrated
immigration into the criminal process to the extent that many sentencing
courts are participating directly and indirectly in facilitating removal;
some are now even entering orders of removal directly. In the case of
lawful permanent residents and other authorized noncitizens, it is the
conviction alone that gives rise to deportability, and in this context,
removal functions as punishment for wrongdoing. Courts should recognize
this evolution and hold that immigration consequences have become the
direct consequences of an aggravated felony conviction and that they
follow from the fact of the conviction alone, automatically and without
opportunity for discretionary relief or meaningful adjudicatory
proceedings in another forum.
Even if the sanction of removal for aggravated felony convictions
continues to be labeled civil or collateral, it would be appropriate to
guarantee a level of procedural protections in criminal court in recognition
of the unique severity of the removal sanction and its currently automatic
imposition. Our constitutional guarantees in the criminal area are
grounded in an unwillingness to impose severe penalties (involving loss of
87
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liberty and separation from family among others) without substantial
procedural protections. This underlying commitment to the protection of
individual liberties should not vanish with the labeling of a proceeding as
“civil.” Where a civil sanction approaches or even surpasses the severity of
criminal penalties, our concerns for proportionality and individual
protection warrant requiring procedural guarantees analogous to criminal
proceedings, including the right to be advised specifically of the nature of
the consequence and the guarantee that the sanction will not be grossly
disproportionate to the offense. Such is the case with the sanction of
removal. 226
Procedural guarantees regarding immigration would not be unique in
proceedings that have been denominated as civil. In State v. Bellamy, 227 the
New Jersey Supreme Court held that, given the severity of civil
commitment, fundamental fairness required that a defendant understand
that he faced possible commitment proceedings as a sex offender before he
pled guilty to a predicate sex offense, even though the court acknowledged
that the separate commitment proceedings were civil and collateral in
nature. The court stated, “‘It matters little if the consequences are called
indirect or collateral when in fact their impact is devastating.’” 228
As discussed above, the ABA Standards on Collateral Sanctions and
Discretionary Disqualification take the position that the broad range of
collateral consequences of criminal convictions, including immigration
consequences, should be integrated into the criminal process and be
considered meaningfully as part of the package of sanctions being imposed
at sentencing. The Standards would require that these collateral
consequences be taken into account by the sentencing judge to ensure that
the “totality of the penalty” is not unduly severe. 229
Given the limited human, professional, and other resources at the
disposal of criminal courts, the practical challenges of instituting such
changes are myriad. At the same time, removal is not truly justifiable and
does not function well as a one‐size‐fits‐all punishment for criminal
conduct, as it is not tailored in any way to the severity of the crime, and it
gives rise to serious problems of equity between otherwise similarly
situated citizen and longtime permanent resident offenders. Thus, rather
than requiring our criminal trial courts to make constitutional
accommodations for an ill‐fitting and often disproportionate punishment,
Congress could resolve the constitutional dilemma by enacting a
substantial revision of those aspects of our immigration law which relate
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On the similarity of removal to criminal sanctions, see Francis, supra note 67, at 714.
835 A.2d 1231 (N.J. 2003).
Id. at 1238 (quoting State v. Heitzman, 527 A.2d 439, 441 (N.J. 1987) (Wilentz, C.J.,
ABA STANDARDS ON COLLATERAL SANCTIONS, supra note 41, at Standard 19‐2.4.
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to crimes and which currently result in the automatic imposition of
removal as a sanction for the very wide range of offenses characterized as
aggravated felonies. Such reform would restore meaningful reality to
individualized discretionary decision‐making, proportionality, and
discretion in the far‐reaching and life‐changing decision whether an
individual should be deported for having committed a particular offense.
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